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In  this  paper  we  present  C.  S.  Peirce's  take  on  the 
difference between science and practice in order to identify the 
role practice plays in his view of the universe. This take is based 
on  a  number  of  notions  about  the  general  nature  of  signs, 
inquiries, inferences and arguments, which we discuss. We then 
survey Peirce's  classification of science,  show the factors it  is 
based on and examine the mutual relations of the various fields 
of scientific study. This lets us finally posit practice in the realm 
of  qualities  and  reactions and  show  the  limits  of  scientific 
inquiry  into  certain  matters.  We  illustrate  our  findings  on  a 
number of examples.
Abstrakt
V  této  práci  presentujeme  C.  S.  Peircovo  stanovisko 
ohledně rozdílu mezi vědou a praxí za účelem identifikace role, 
jíž  praxe  hraje  v  jeho  náhledu  na  vesmír.  Toto  stanovisku  je 
založeno na řadě poznatků o obecné povaze znaků, zkoumání, 
inferencí  a  argumentů,  jež  diskutujeme.  Následně  rozebíráme 
Peircovu  klasifikaci  vědy  a  poukazujeme  na  faktory,  jež  ji 
zakládají,  a  na  vzájemné vztahy rozličných  oblastí  vědeckého 
studia. To nám umožňuje konečně umístit praxi do sféry kvalit a 
reakcí a ukázat omezení vědeckého zkoumání jistých záležitostí. 
Tyto naše závěry ilustrujeme řadou příkladů.




Charles Sanders Peirce was an American scientist whose 
contributions to various fields of inquiry, especially mathematics, 
logic  and  philosophy,  continue  to  impress  generations  of  his 
successors. Despite the massive advancements he made and the 
incredible volume of his works, he is not among the best known 
or  the  most  popular  philosophers.  We aim to  present  the  key 
aspects of his semiotics with special regards to his delimitation 
and  classification  of  science.  The  reason  for  this  is  twofold. 
Firstly, we believe and intend to show that this delimitation and 
classification  is  the  result  of  consideration  of  certain  parts  of 
Peirce's  semiotics,  namely  of  the  findings  of  speculative 
grammar and critical logic. Secondly,  we consider it important 
to discuss the role practice plays in Peirce's view of science and 
of the universe at large. 
But  our  motivation  is  also  personal.  Ever  since  our 
beginnings in the human sciences our main interest was in the 
characteristic  properties  of  certain groups of text.  At  first,  we 
were only interested in literary fiction – what makes up a genre1, 
or rather what are the properties of texts in one genre that no 
other texts have? A natural follow-up to such an inquiry is to 
broaden the scope from differences between genres of fiction to 
all genres of texts. Obviously, the intristic properties that can be 
found are not always inside of the texts themselves. That is why 
semiotics,  and  especially  Peircean  semiotics,  is  the  perfect 
framework for this type of analysis. Texts are systems of signs 
1 Such as “modernistic novel”, “authorial myth” etc.
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which are connected to various other systems of signs and sign 
production.  This  paper  shows  Peirce's  view of  the  issue  with 
emphasis on its general relevance for other fields of inquiry.
We  present  the  topics  of  this  paper  in  six  chapters. 
Chapter II explains the three basic phenomenological categories 
as well as Peirce's classification of signs. This classification is 
based  on  a  particular  analysis  of  the  nature  of  signs  and  of 
semiosis.  We  focus  especially  on  the  class  of  argument  and 
explicate  the  features  which  differentiate  it  from  the  other 
classes.
Chapter  III  discusses  the  nature  and  various  forms  of 
argumentation, the different ways of fixation of belief, and the 
role  argumentation  plays  in  this  regard.  Argumentation  is 
inference, and a certain arrangement of particularly operational 
inferences constitute the scientific method.
Science is  much more than just  the application  of  this 
method  of  inferring.  Chapter  IV  elaborates  on  Peirce's 
classification  of  science  and  on  what  distinguishes  it  from 
practice.  We  pay  special  attention  to  the  dependence  of  the 
classes on each other and on practice.
Chapter  V  discusses  Peirce's  view  of  God,  arts,  and 
practice in order to complete our picture of his take on how a 
mind operates in the universe. Chapter VI illustrates this picture, 
which we try to finally present very concisely in our conclusion 
in chapter VII.
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II The Notion of Argument in Peirce's Speculative 
Grammar
II.I. Introduction
This chapter aims to outline how the notion of argument 
appears  and  operates  in  Peirce's  speculative  grammar2 and  to 
show  its  application  on  an  example  of  practical  human 
communication.  Because  of  the  extremely  broad  scope  of 
Peirce's research, we find it important to approach this topic from 
the  very  outside  so  as  to  properly  set  up  Peirce's  notion  of 
argument in this part of his theory. This chapter focuses on the 
later form of Peirce's semiotic theory but we are using some of 
Peirce's  earlier  works  where  we  find  it  enlightening  for 
understanding the later ones.
2 This means this chapter deals only with the general theory of the nature and 
meaning of arguments rather than  with an examination of their logical validity or 
potential to reach truth. More on that in chapter III and IV.
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II.I Phaneroscopy
Charles Sanders Peirce was born in  the year  1839 and 
died in the year 1914. In his 75 years of life he worked in many 
fields of scientific research and is  today known as one of the 
greatest American thinkers of all time (Weiss: 1934), the founder 
of both pragmaticism and semiotics. Entering the work of such a 
giant is never an easy task and we will only focus here on topics 
central to our problem.
That being said, we still have to start with the broadest 
scope  to  show  why  we  consider  Peirce's  approach  worth 
investigating. We might generally call his efforts a pragmatically, 
logically oriented phenomenology and, while a somewhat fitting 
description,  this  demands  a  lot  of  further  elaboration. 
Phenomenology in Hegelian sense is somewhat at odds with the 
idea of formal logic and, indeed, Peirce himself decided to call 
his  effort  “phaneroscopy” (CP 8.213),  among other  reasons to 
distinguish  it  from  Hegelian  phenomenology.  Rather  than 
metaphysical, ideal or historical, Peirce's approach is logical and 
at the same time semiotic because it considers anything present 
to  a  mind  to  be  a  sign  suspended  in  an  interplay  of  basic 
categories.  This  logic  is  therefore inevitably dependent  on the 
discovery of these founding categories – that is on phaneroscopy 
itself – and consists mostly of a categorization based on the key 
conceptions  identified  in  the  phaneron:  Firstness,  Secondness 
and  Thirdness.  Peirce  himself  puts  it  like  this:  "I  essay  an 
analysis of what appears in the world. It is not metaphysics that 
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we are dealing with: only logic. Therefore, we do not ask what 
really is, but only what appears to everyone of us in every minute 
of  our  lives. I  analyze  experience,  which  is  the  cognitive 
resultant of our past lives, and find in it three elements. I call 
them Categories" (CP 2.84).
Pragmaticism  plays  an  important  role  in  Peirce's 
philosophy as it  anchors the notion of examining the logic of 
sign interaction mediating the phaneron to the mind by taking 
into consideration the effects of a given sign and the real context 
in which it is produced and interpreted (Nicole: 2011). This is 
why  we  think  that  it  is  worthwhile  to  experiment  with 
applications  of  his  highly  analytical  and  in  many  places 
theoretical endeavor. 
10
II.II The Ceno-Pythagorean Categories
As  mentioned  above,  in  the  core  of  Peirce's 
logical/semiotic  system  lay  the  categories  of  Firstness, 
Secondness,  and  Thirdness.  Peirce  called  these  “Ceno-
Pythagorean” as they are truly universal and are related to and 
named  after  numbers,  same  way  the  mathematic-centered 
philosophy  of  Pythagoreanism  constructed  their  theories, 
although, according to Peirce, there is no approach amongs the 
Pythagoreans resembling these categories at all (CP 2.87). Peirce 
states, in  the  relation to other philosophical systems as well as 
his own, that „a category is an element of phenomena of the first 
rank of generality”  (CP 5.43).  The immense importance these 
categories have in Peirce's system is clearly reflected in the huge 
amount of reformulations and notes he makes on this topic and in 
the  number  of  cases  where  he  identifies  then  in  the  various 
objects of his inquiries. They first appear in “On a New List of 
Categories“ from the year 1867 but he frequently kept returning 
to them in the following 40 years. This on one hand provides us 
with valuable resources  to understand his conceptions  through 
comparation,  on  the  other  one  it,  however,  creates  a  massive 
terminological confusion. We find it quite  enlightening to look 
here at the different terms he chose for these categories as this 
points out their respective characters in an apparent way. We also 
briefly  introduce  our  understanding  of  these  categories  and 
indicate how they relate to Peirce's view of arguments.
In his 1867 paper, Peirce laid out the three categories in 
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between  2  major  conceptions:  “being”  and  “substance”. 
Substance is the manifold inapplicable to a predicate, being is the 
unity equally inapplicable to a subject (CP 1.548). Thus, there is 
a need for a search for conceptions allowing the passage from the 
manifold to the unity.  According to Peirce,  “the conception of 
being arises upon the formation of a proposition“ (CP 1.551). A 
proposition  necessarilly entails  not  only  a  term  to  express 
substance  but  also  another  one  to  express  the  quality  of  that 
substance.  The function  of  the conception  of  being then  is  to 
unite  the  quality  with the  substance.  Therefore,  quality  in  its 
broadest sense is the first conception on the way from being to 
substance (ibid.). Apparent possibility of an agreement upon the 
nature of some quality in some respect leads Peirce to establish 
the  term  „ground“,  „a  pure  abstraction,  reference  to  which 
constitutes a quality or general attribute“(ibid.).
Peirce further states that, according to the knowledge of 
contemporary empirical psychology, we can only know a quality 
„by  means  of  its  contrast  or  similarity  to  another“.  This 
inevitably  requires  a  reference  to  a  correlate  which  is  also 
necessarily introduced with the introduction of a reference to the 
ground. A reference to a correlate is the second conception, third 
is a reference to an interpretant, to „a mediating representation 
which represents the relate to be a representation of the same 
correlate which this mediating representation itself represents“. 
Reference to an interpretant is the final step on the way from 
being  to  substace  and,  as  to  be  seen  below,  an  essential 
component of Peirce's theory of argument.
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Here we finally arrive at Peirce's early list of categories. 
These are:
Being
Quality (Reference to a ground)
Relation (Reference to a correlate)
Representation (Reference to an Interpretant)
Substance (ibid.)
The three intermediate conceptions are termed accidents 
in this paper, although the terminology will be subject of many 
changes  during  the  course  of  Peirce's  research.  These  five 
categories afford five supposable objects:
What is.
Quale – that which refers to a ground
Relate – that which refers to ground and correlate
Representamen – that which refers to ground, correlate, 
and interpretant
It. (CP 1.557)
This  is  the  basis  of  the  speculative  grammar  Peirce 
worked on and kept on changing and improving for the majority 
of his life. Quality was later called Firstness, mostly because it is 
a term free of previous meaning and also for the aforementioned 
reference to Pythagoreans (this also holds true for Secondness 
and Thirdness). Relation is also called reaction or Secondness, 
the  middle  term  effectively  pointing  out  the  effects  of  this 
category.  Representation  is  also  refered  to  as  mediation  or 
Thirdness,  for  similar  reasons.  The  notions  of  being  and 
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substance  were  always  in  the  background  of  Peirce's  theory, 
although he later rarely mentions them directly.
Before moving onto Peirce's ten genuine classes of signs, 
we consider  it  interesting  to  attempt  to  characterize  the  three 
categories in an associative way. 
Firstness is probably most famously illustrated with this 
Peirce's example: “If you ask a mineralogist what hardness is, he 
will say that it is what one predicates of a body that one cannot 
scratch with a knife. But a simple person will think of hardness 
as a simple positive possibility the realization of which causes a 
body  to  be  like  a  flint.  That  idea  of  hardness  is  an  idea 
of Firstness.” (CP 8.329) 
While  Firstness  is  a  concept  that  seems  very  abstract, 
inaccessible and is therefore often considered hard to understand, 
it is actually structurally simplest of the three categories because 
of its inability to degenerate (more on that in ch. II.IV). Based on 
what is said above it seems clear that Secondness always entails 
Firstness. According to Peirce, the general Firstness of all true 
Secondness is existence or actuality, it is „just when and where it 
takes place, and has no other being.“ (CP 1.532)
A  genuine  Thirdness  is  the  category  of  mediation, 
generalization,  intelligibility  and  influence.  Peirce  wrote  that: 
„The first is agent, the second patient, the third is the action by 
which the former influences the latter. Between the beginning as 
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first,  and the end as last,  comes the process which leads from 
first to last“ (CP 1.361).
Let  us  now  try  to  explicate  these  categories  on  an 
example we will work with in this chapter and will later return to 
in chapter VI:
Two  people  come  home  on  a  rainy  day,  soaking  wet. 
They knock off their shoes and one of them proceeds towards the 
kitchen. The other one notices this and says: „It's easy to catch a 
cold in wet clothes.” Then they both go to the dressing room to 
change.
To briefly discuss the categories of Firstness, Secondness, 
and Thirdness we can easily consider only on the first sentence 
of the example, limit our investigation to our own viewpoint as 
readers  of  this  short  text,  and  also  disregard  its  narrative 
implications and only focus on the mechanisms of emergence of 
its interpretants. Even with all these limitations the matter is still 
an obfuscated one. There are three subjects in play: the set of 
black  markings  on  the  page  (or  screen),  the  blank  space 
surrounding them, and our mind. The lower level of analysis here 
is the interaction of the markings and the blank space. They both 
have  their  respective  characteristic  Firstness  and  their 
Secondness  consists  of  their  specific  mutual  spatial 
configuration.  A third,  as  mentioned  previously,  is  that  which 
joins  a  first  and  a  second.  In  this  case  it  is  the  sum  of 
grammatical, syntactic, stylistic,  and semantic rules of English. 
15
Thirdness is what guarantees the sentence's intelligibility.
The higher level of analysis concerns us as the recipients 
of  the  text.  Again  both  we  and  the  text  have  our  respective, 
specific Firstness. There is Secondness in the here and now of 
our mind in the relation to the text. And there is Thirdness in the 
laws of  interpretation that  mediate  between our  mind and the 
markings through allowing the flow of the semeiosis to transfer 
the meaning between signs in the form of the black markings and 
in the form of our mental concepts.
Before we work with this example any further we must 
first discuss Peirce's ten genuine classes of signs.
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II.III The Genuine Classes of Signs
Let  us  now  skip  some  30  years  in  the  chronology  of 
Peirce's  work  and  discuss  how  he  arrives  at  his  notion  of 
argument. He obviously starts at his three accidents (or, rather, 
categories, as he calls them most of the time, starting even in the 
'New List') and proceeds to combine these with three threefold 
correlations:  a/  according to  the mode of  apprehension of  the 
sign, b/ according to the relation of the sign to its dynamic object 
and  c/  according  to  the  relation  of  the  sign  to  the  normal 
interpretant. This would add up to 27 categories had Peirce not 
used the logical rule „nota notae est nota rei ipsus“ or “a sign of 
a sign of a thing is a sign of the thing itself”. That way he arrives 
at  the  ten  classes  he  considered  “genuine”,  that  is  basic  and 
nondegenerate3. We find it important to show and briefly discuss 
these here as the Peircean notion of argument stem directly from 
them.
First, what does Peirce mean by a sign, an object, and an 
interpretant. A sign is the central term of Peirce's phaneroscopy. 
Signs are mediators between their objects and their interpretants 
and only this triadic connection is capable of what allows the 
mind  to  operate  the  percepts  and  the  universe  to  operate  its 
parts4. Thirdness is therefore the mode of being of genuine signs 
(see ch. II.IV). An object is what a sign corresponds to. There are 
two kinds of objects of any sign. An „immediate object“ is an 
object as represented by a sign. A „dynamical object“ is an object 
3 We discuss degenerate signs in chapter II.IV.
4 More on that in chapter V.
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as  the  actual  cause  of  a  sign.  An  interpretant  is  “the  proper 
significant  outcome  of  a  sign”  (CP  5.473). Interpretants  are 
divided  by  Peirce  into  three  distinct  types.  An  „immediate 
interpretant“  is  an  interpretant  as  represented  by  a  sign.  A 
„dynamical  intepretant“  is  an  interpretant  that  is  actually 
produced  by  a  sign.  A „final  (or  normal)  interpretant“  is  an 
interpretant that would be produced if a sign were properly and 
fully  understood.  Interpretants  also  trichotomize  to  emotional, 
energetic,  and logical.  An emotional interpretant is  always the 
first proper significant effect of any sign, entirely in the realm of 
feelings (CP 5.475). An energetic interpretant expresses the effort 
awakened by the  emotional  effect  of  a  sign  (ibid.).  Finally,  a 
logical interpretant allows for general reference and is connected 
to conditionality and habit (CP 5.480-6).
Correlation  a/  consists  of  “qualisigns”,  “sinsigns”  and 
“legisigns”, depending on the category they're in. Correlation b/ 
consists of „icons“, „indexes“ and „symbols“ and correlation c/ 
of  „rhemas“,  „dicisigns“  and  „arguments“.  A qualisign  is  the 
ground of perception, pure quality. A sinsign is a pure existent, 
something existing „hic et nunc“ (CP 1.458), a dyad – a reaction 
of  one  thing  against  another,  insistance  without  reason  (CP 
1.456). A legisign is then a law, a rule, or a convention. An icon 
represents  its  object  through  a  communion  of  qualities  that 
produces  a  resemblance  among  them  (Icon,  2009),  an  index 
through  being  materially  connected  and  a  symbol  through 
convention. A rhema is „a merely qualitative interpretant, i.e. it 
selects from the relation Sign-Object only what it has of essential 
quality“  (Rhema,  2009).  „A  dicisign  is  a  sign  which  is 
18
understood to represent its object in respect to actual existence“ 
(EP  2:292).   Finally,  an  argument  is  a  sign  that  distinctly 
represents its interpretant, which it is intended to determine  (CP 
2.95).
Lets  start  with  a  look  at  the  most  „extreme“  genuine 
classes.  On one hand there  is  the  „qualisign“ in  the narrower 
sense.  This  is  the only class  based on a  qualisign in  the first 
correlate and it must, therefore, be based on an icon and a rhema 
in the second and third correlate, respectively. This class is „the 
most  fundamental  of  the  phaneron,  embodied  in  all  the  other 
classes  of  signs  as  the  fundamental  source  of  originality  in 
semeiosis“ (Ten genuine classes, 2009). On the other one there is 
the „argument“ in the narrower sense, the only class based on an 
argument  in  the  third  correlate,  which  logically  requires  a 
legisign  and  a  symbol  in  the  first  and  second  correlate, 
respectively. It is „ a habitual sign (that) represents its object by 
habit as to produce a logical dynamic communicative effect and 
a logical final communicative effect“ (ibid.). We will discuss this 
definition later in this chapter. For now it is important to note 
that these „outer“ classes represent the starting and final points 
of a journey leading from a mere possibility of an effect through 
different stages of reaction and interpretation into the realm of 
logic, rules, and reason.
The class of argument is closely connected to the class of 
proposition.  They  both  consist  of  habitual  signs  (legisigns) 
representing their objects by habit (symbols) but the difference 
between them is  that  arguments have arguments in  their  third 
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correlate while propositions have dicisigns in the same place. In 
other words while arguments produce logical dynamic and final 
effects, propositions produce dynamic and final interpretants that 
are energetic. The difference here really is that propositions deal 
with actual existence and arguments dwell within the realm of 
habits and laws. 
Let  us  now return  to  the  example  set  in  the  previous 
chapter. Actual Peircean interpretation is always a complicated 
matter,  mostly because of the „incremental“  nature of Peirce's 
theory of sign we mentioned earlier – if there is a sign of higher 
class there are signs of the lower classes as well. That being so, 
we  could  easily  find  a  representative  of  all  the  ten  genuine 
classes  in  any  given  example  but,  even  if  we  for  now  limit 
ourselves just to the classes of proposition and argument, it still 
remains  a  pretty  messy  task.  We  will  therefore  limit  our 
interpretation even further and only consider the situation from 
the viewpoint of its actors and also only regarding the response 
to being wet. With these limitations there remain two instances 
of the  proposition/argument confusion. 
The  first  person  walking  towards  the  kitchen  is  a 
proposition in the sense that it conventionally communicates to 
the other person that the first one is going to make something 
(probably a hot beverage) and it elicits an actual, energetic effect. 
It is an argument in the sense that it can be shown in the classical 
syllogistic  structure:  a  person going  to  the  kitchen right  after 
getting home goes there to make something; a person is going to 
the kitchen right after getting home; that person goes to make 
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something. The other instance is very similar to this one, as a 
person saying „It's easy to catch a cold in wet clothes.” makes at 
the same time a proposition and an argument, produces both an 
actual and a logical effect.
As the example shows, the different classes of signs are 
inseparably  interconnected.  However,  we  need  to  discuss  the 
degenerate classes of sign here before we examine this matter 
any further.
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II.IV The Degenerate and Genuine Categories
We already mentioned Peirce's idea of degeneracy several 
times in this paper. Now it's time to discuss it in detail as this 
notion  is  the  last  piece  necessary  to  draw rough  contours  of 
Pierce's  notion  of  argument.  Before  we get  to  the  degenerate 
classes of signs we need to first discuss the degeneration of the 
basic categories.
Peirce himself wrote in his treatise on different kinds of 
Secondness that: "It must be extremely difficult for those who 
are untrained to such analyses of conceptions to make any sense 
of  all  this"  (CP 1.527).  This  shows  that  it  indeed  is  a  fairly 
complicated topic. Let us, as Peirce did, start with the notion of 
genuine and degenerate Secondness, as "among Firstnesses there 
is no distinction of the genuine and the degenerate" (CP 1.529). 
Secondness always requires a first and a second, but it is 
not a compound of two facts, it is a single fact about two objects 
(CP  1.526).  There  is,  however,  a  difference  between  the 
Secondness of the object called the first and the one called the 
second. If there is a reason to call one of the two the first and the 
other  the  second  it  must,  according  to  Peirce,  be  "that  the 
Secondness is more accidental to the former than the latter" (CP 
1.527).  This  means  that  if  there  is  a  first  and  a  second  in  a 
Secondness then this first might have its own genuine Firstness 
that is not modified by this Secondness (the Secondness is only 
accidental  to  it)  while  this  Secondness  at  the  same  time 
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constitutes the very being of this second. Peirce shows this on a 
very abstract, yet also very illustrative, example of matter and 
quality.  In his  view,  quality is  not changed in any way by its 
relation to matter while matter cannot even exist without having 
some  qualities.  Matter  is  therefore  a  genuine  second  while 
quality is a degenerate one in this Secondness. As a whole this 
Secondness is then considered degenerate as well because one of 
its seconds is only a Firstness. A degenerate Secondness "really 
amounts to nothing but this, that a subject, in its being a second, 
has a Firstness, or quality"(CP 1.528).
Let us now briefly return to our example from the chapter 
II.II. We obviously identified a Secondness in both levels of our 
analysis. We might say that the former one should be considered 
degenerate as both of the seconds are degenerate as well - they 
only allow for  each others  qualities,  nothing more.  The latter 
Secondness is also a degenerate one because while one of the 
seconds is qenuine, as mind changes by interacting with a text, 
the other one is still degenerate.
The notion of  degeneracy we just  discussed doesn't  involve a 
third but Peirce later came with an approach involving Thirdness 
as  well,  in  a  letter  titled  “Degenerate  Thirdness”.  Similarly, 
category  the  first  is  by  its  simplistic  nature  incapable  of 
degeneracy  (CP 5.68)  and  category  the  second  can  be  either 
genuine or degenerate (CP 5.69), although here it can also be so 
only "approximately"  (ibid.).  A degenerate  second is  such "in 
which  there  is  Secondness  indeed,  but  a  weak  or  secondary 
Secondness that is not in the pair in its own quality, but belongs 
to it only in a certain respect" (ibid.).
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Returning  to  our  example  again,  this  approach  yields 
different  results.  While  we  must  still  consider  the  former 
discussed seconds degenerate  as their  Secondness is  in  a  way 
only potential, we can now consider the latter genuine because it 
is completely realized. This shows that the later approach might 
bring  better  results  in  our  applications  by  outlining  the 
differences between different utterances.
The matter is a bit more complicated with Thirdness as it 
is  capable  of  two  different  ways  of  degeneracy.  The  “lesser” 
degree of degeneracy involves what Peirce calls  “an irrational 
plurality”  (CP 5.70).  It  is  a  formally  plural  representation  of 
something that is in nature only a sort of complicated duality. 
Peirce provides an example of the conception of subdivision of 
categories  for  this  form  of  degeneracy.  The  most  degenerate 
Thirdness is “where we conceive a mere Quality of Feeling, or 
Firstness,  to  represent  itself  to  itself  as  Representation“  (CP 
5.71). Pierce offers the notion of „pure self-consciousness“ as an 
example  and  then  tries  to  explicate  it  further  in  a  beatifully 
Borgesian digression (ibid.).
The apparent difficulties with explaining the degenerate 
forms of Thirdness stem from the fact that they, unlike the forms 
of Secondness, do not operate as an easily identifiable,  linked 
and stable conceptions. According to Peirce, any class of signs 
for which Thirdness is the key element results in a trichotomy, 
spawning three new genera. These then continue to divide in a 
like manner, only being harder and harder to discern with each 
succeeding  division  (CP 5.72).  Peirce  illustrates  these  on  the 




II.V The Degenerate Classes of Signs
Although  Peirce  himself  found  this  subject  rather 
interesting  (CP  5.  76),  he  didn’t  spend  too  much  space  on 
discussing it further. That is why we base this part of our paper 
on the work of V. Romanini from the University of Sao Paulo, 
who essentially expands on Peirce’s ideas we just discussed.
In  doing  so  he  combines  the  notion  of  degenerate 
categories and the logical rule Peirce used to arrive at his original 
ten genuine classes to develop and name whopping 66 classes of 
signs (Romanini: 2009b). This is very interesting for us because 
we believe this allows for a more precise and fruitful analysis.
Following the pattern of the chapter II.II, let us first look 
at  the  degeneration  of  the  most  fundamental  of  classes:  the 
Qualisign. Obviously, none is possible as this is the only genuine 
class completely situated in the realm of Firstness and therefore 
incapable of degeneracy.
The  class  of  Argument  is,  on  the  other  hand,  fully  based  on 
representation.  An interesting decision Romanini  made was to 
name  the  degenerate  forms  of  argument  the   induction  and 
abduction (ibid.) as this does in a way correspond to the meaning 
Peirce  affirmed  to  these  terms  in  his  logical  critic  and 
methodeutic, however, it also invites a lot of possible criticism. 
For the purpose of this paper we shall stick to these terms.
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Being the relatively genuine out of the rhema – dicisign – 
argument trichotomy, argument is well fit for another level of the 
analysis mentioned in the previous chapter. The lesser degree of 
degeneracy transfers an argument into an induction while losing 
its capability of producing a final logical interpretant, replacing it 
with  an  energetic  one.  The  higher  degree  transfers  it  into  an 
abduction  which  doesn’t  produce  any  final  interpretant 
whatsoever.
Leaving “lower” new classes aside, two new degenerate 
classes  directly  connected  to  argument.  Romanini  calls  them 
“Inductive  symbols”  and  “Abductive  symbols”  (2009a).  To 
properly  finish  the  discussion  of  our  example  we  must  also 
consider the degenerate forms of proposition. The key feature of 
a proposition is that it  entails a dicisign. Dicisign is already a 
reactionally degenerate symbol (CP 5.73) and as such can only 
degenerate one step further. Romanini calls this degenerate form 
syntax,  the  difference  to  dicisign  being  that  it  produces  an 
emotional final effect instead of an energetic one. This of course 
gives  rise  to  one  degenerate  class  connected  to  proposition, 
called “Syntactic symbol” (Romanini: 2009a).
Now  let  us  finally  go  back  to  the  example  from  the 
chapter II.III and see how we can apply these new classes. In the 
first instance we discussed nothing changes about the nature of 
the proposition. What shifts is our classification of the argument: 
although it  can  be  shown in  the  form of  a  syllogism we can 
hardly maintain the position that the act of going into the kitchen 
produced a  logical final  interpretant.  The dynamic interpretant 
indeed  really  is  logical,  however,  we  believe  it  is  correct  to 
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support the notion that an interpretation of this act as a sign is in 
this situation carried out to the maximal extent in the realm of 
relation  rather  than  mentality,  it’s  rather  an  act  than  a  habit. 
Instead of a proposition/argument confusion we are now dealing 
with a proposition/inductive symbol one.
In  the  second  instance  nothing  changes  about  the 
proposition either. However, even the argument still belongs to 
the proper argument class because its final interpretant is without 
a doubt a logical one. This allows us to observe and name the 
difference between the two situations presented in our example.
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II.VI Conclusion
The class of argument and its degenerate classes in a way 
stand on the very top of Peirce’s speculative grammar. Being the 
most complex of all classes of signs, it entails the presence of all 
the others and are the “highest” of them all, closely tied to the 
notion of God5. This chapter shows that a proper consideration of 
subtle differences among their various manifestations can lead to 
a more precise understanding of the universe, of the place people 
have in it and of the ways they relate to it. 
5 See chapter V.
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In  the  previous  chapter  we  discussed  the  notion  of 
argument as a class of sign standing on the very top of Peirce's 
classification system, identified  where and how it differentiates 
from the lesser classes and also found several “degenerate” types 
of argument. Here we try to elaborate on the inner workings of 
arguments based on Peirce's studies in logic of science in order 
to allow our research further precision.
This obviously demands a further specification as logic in 
the broad sense underlays  all  of Peirce's  thinking.  Lets  take a 
look  at  a  list  of  Peirce's  topics  of  research  (or,  respectively, 
memoirs meant to cover these topics) to show what exactly we 
are going to focus on. This list was composed by J. Ransdell of 
Texas Tech University (The significance...: 1998) but it is based 
on the contents of Peirce's 1902 application for a grant from the 
Carnegie Institution (MS L75) and its older drafts. This method 
is  necessary  because  of  the  combination  of  Peirce's 
perfectionism  and  his  aversion  to  repetition  as  he  made   5 
versions of this  application before finally submitting the sixth 
one,  each  developing  different  topics  while  ignoring  or  just 
mentioning others.
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The list by Mr. Randell nicely shows how systematic and 
thorough Peirce's philosophical investigations were and also how 
logically  are  the  different  topics  organized  –  based  on  their 
presuppositional  relationships.  This  means  that  the  latter 
concepts or categories are based on and rely on the former ones. 
Therefore,  the  list  begins  with  the  topics  on  mathematics, 
especially those that  have to  do with mathematical  logic.  The 
following  memoirs  deal  with  phenomenology,  the  normative 
sciences,  and,  finally,  metaphysics.  The  normative  sciences 
include esthetics, ethics and semiotic or logic. Semiotic and logic 
in its broad sense comprise of philosophical grammar, logic in 
the relatively narrow sense, and philosophical rhetorics6.
Here we see the place of logic in the relatively narrow 
sense  in  the  system  of  Peirce's  investigations.  This  area  of 
inquiry is also mentioned as “critical logic” by Peirce and it deals 
with theory of  inference and as  such it  focuses  on abductive, 
inductive and deductive logic. Let us now briefly introduce what 
Peirce  had  in  mind  with  these  different  types  of  inferential 
relations.
6 More on that in chapter V.
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III.II Deduction, Induction, Abduction
Sometime around the year 1865 Peirce begins to work on 
and broaden the then commonly accepted division of arguments 
between  two  subclasses,  the  class  of  deductive  arguments 
(necessary  inferences)  and  the  class  of  inductive  arguments 
(probable inferences) (Deduction...:  2001).  He holds the view 
that there are in fact two distinct classes of probable inferences, 
which  he  decided  to  call  inductive  inferences  and  abductive 
inferences. A deductive inference is generally an argument from 
a rule through a case to a result – the fact that the case is known 
to  conform  to  the  rule  is  what  makes  the  result  necessary, 
generally speaking.  An inductive one  on the other  hand is  an 
argument from a result through a case to a rule. This means that 
an inductive argument is not necessary as a rule that is to be the 
conclusion of that argument is only claimed and not known – in 
other words, in contrast to a deductive argument, the premises of 
an inductive one do not guarantee the validity of the conclusion.
This is of course a problem that the philosophers were 
concerned with since the ancient times. Can inductive reasoning 
lead to a proper knowledge if its conclusion is only probable and 
not certain? There are two major problems, first that an induction 
often  consist  of  a  generalization  about  the  properties  of  all 
members of a certain class based on the properties of only a few 
of the members, and second that an induction often relies on the 
notion that past events will occur in the future the same way they 
did previously.
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These problems were in Peirce's focus as soon as in his 
well known series of papers called “Illustrations of the Logic of 
Science”  from the 70's of the 19th century. Peirce regarded the 
question of validity of an inference solely as a matter of facts 
(Koehn: 1973, p. 157). Whether we are inclined to think that an 
argument  is  bad  or  otherwise  is  of  no  consequence,  it  only 
matters  whether  the  facts  asserted  in  the  premises  of  that 
argument relate to the facts asserted by the conclusion in such a 
way that  for  the  most  part  the  conclusion  in  fact  follows the 
premises (ibid, p. 159). If the validity of an argument rests solely 
on facts the problem of validating any sort of synthetic reasoning 
arises. The solution to this problem rests in the notion that in our 
asking about the validity of an inference we already presuppose a 
number of facts, such as “that there are such states of mind as 
doubt  and  belief  –  that  a  passage  from  one  to  the  other  is 
possible, the object of though remaining the same, and that this 
transition is subject to some rules which all the minds alike are 
bound by” (Peirce 1877: p. 4). It is this transition from doubt to 
belief that Peirce refers to as inquiry (ibid., p. 6) and explores the 
different  species  of  it  based  on  whether  the  valid-invalid 
distinction can be made for it or not.
The simplest  kind of inquiry has  reference only to  the 
mind  of  an  individual  inquirer  (Koehn:  1973,  p.  159).  Peirce 
calls  this  kind  the  method  of  “tenacity”  and  considers  it 
impossible to make the valid-invalid distinction for it as different 
inquirers can consider the same rule of reasoning both great and 
poor. The second simplest kind of inquiry is called the method of 
“authority” and it has reference to a definite, limited community. 
Here the rules of passage from doubt to belief are the same for 
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all the members of a certain community – but it follows that as 
such  it  can  never  resolve  differences  between  different 
communities. This leads us to the third kind of inquiry, called the 
“a priori” method, which has reference to an indefinite, unlimited 
group. Here the rules of passage are found within the mind itself. 
Although Peirce regards this method as much more intellectual 
and  respectable  than  the  previous  two  he  also  finds  it  most 
apparently  insufficient  as  there  is  no  way to  tell  if  what  one 
thinks to be clear and distinct in his thought really is so: “[This 
method] makes of inquiry something similar to the development 
of taste...” (Peirce 1877: p. 10)7.
Knowing that Peirce spent a significant part of his career 
on natural  sciences,  it's  hardly surprising that it  is  exactly the 
scientific method of inquiry that, he holds,  can alone allow for 
the valid-invalid distinction in fact. The existence of “the rules 
which  all  the  minds  alike  are  bound  by”  rests  on  the  reality 
hypothesis, that is on the supposition of an external permanency 
that, although affecting individual minds differently, will lead all 
alike  minds   to  the  same  conclusion  given  they  abide  to  the 
scientific method. The notion of validity is  closely tied to the 
notion of truth as an argument is only valid if it is of the kind that 
generally  leads  an  inquirer  from  true  premises  to  a  true 
conclusion.  Here  arises  the  topic  of  probability,  which  Peirce 
considers  a  problem of  logic.  In  our  trying  to  determine  the 
numerical probability of a possible fact we are really trying to 
ascertain  the  numerical  value  of  a  mode  of  inference.  If  the 
inference is demonstrative, then it is such that if its premises are 
true  the  conclusion  is  always  true.  If  it  is  probable,  then  the 
7 More on this in chapter III.IV
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inferential rule leads from true premises to the true conclusion 
only  for  the  most  part.  The  reality  hypothesis  forms  the 
foundation of our ability to distinguish the worth of an inference 
both in general and numerically: “in the long run, there is a real 
fact that corresponds to the idea of probability, and it is that a 
given  mode  of  inference  sometimes  proves  successful  and 
sometimes not, and that in a ratio ultimately fixed” (Peirce 1878: 
p. 606).
Peirce identifies  another  type  of  an argument  as  going 
from a rule through a result to a case. This type of inference can 
be considered a sort of „educated guess“ (Deduction...: 2001)8, a 
probable argument of a kind. Peirce calls this type of inference 
„hypothesis“  in  his  earlier  writings  and  „presumption”, 
„retroduction”,  or,  most  commonly,  “abduction”  in  his  later 
writings and considered it fundamentally important for the logic 
of science: “[a]bduction is the process of forming explanatory 
hypotheses. It is the only logical operation which introduces 
any  new  idea”  (CP  5.172),  he  noted  and  added  that  it 
encompasses  “all  the  operations  by  which  theories  and 
conceptions  are  engendered”  (CP 5.590).  In  Peirce's  view, 
abduction is the first stage of theory assessment: deduction then 
allows  for  deriving  of  testable  consequences  from  the 
explanatory hypotheses that abduction helped to conceive, and 
induction finally helps to reach a verdict on the hypotheses that 
is  dependent  on  the  number  of  testable  consequences 
successfully verified (Peirce on Abduction: 2011).
8 There is a more familiar name for it than abduction; for it is neither more 
nor less than guessing. (HP 2.898-899) 
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Although this paper is not very much concerned with the 
temporal development of Peirce's thought we find it important to 
note  here  that  his  view of  abduction  (as  well  as  many other 
topics he concerned himself with for a prolonged period of time) 
somewhat shifted over the course of his research as the different 
approaches  shed  some  additional  light  onto  the  nature  of  his 
logic  of  science.  According  to  A.  W.  Burks,  Peirce  at  first 
thought  of  abduction,  and  inference  generally,  as  of  an 
evidencing  process.  The  difference  between  abduction  and 
induction  then  was  the  same  as  between  the  explanatory, 
theoretical part of science and its summarizing, descriptive part: 
abduction was considered an inference from a body of data to a 
hypothesis, while induction was considered an inference from a 
sample to a whole (Burks: 1946, p. 301). Sometime during  the 
last  decade of  the 19th century Peirce widened the concept  of 
inference  to  include  methodological  processes  as  well  as 
evidencing  ones:  induction  became  the  method  of  testing 
hypotheses, and abduction the method of discovering them.
Induction as a  method of  testing hypotheses  can be of 
three different kinds. The first one, crude induction, “goes on the 
presumption that the future experience of a given phenomenon 
won’t be completely at variance with all the past experience of 
it”  (CP  2.756).   It  is  the  weakest  kind  of  induction  as  its 
conclusions  are  easily demolished in  any given moment  by a 
single counter-instance. The next kind of induction is qualitative. 
It   “is  not  based  upon  experience  in  one  mass  (as  the  crude 
induction),  nor upon the experience of a definite collection of 
numerable  instances  of  equal  evidential  values  (as  the 
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quantitative  induction),  but  upon  a  “stream of  experience”  of 
different parts whose evidential value needs to be estimated by 
the  investigator”  (CP 2.759).  This  kind  of  induction  provides 
conclusions  that  may  be  very  valuable  for  initial  testing  of 
hypotheses but which rely on constant evaluation of the sense of 
the impressions that the instances being experiences make upon 
the inquirer.  Quantitative induction is  “the statistical  inference 
according to which the value of a sample is approximately the 
value of the class, or the real probability in question” (CP 2.758). 
Peirce later calls qualitative and quantitative induction “gradual 
inductions” as they are of the kind "which makes a new estimate 
of  the  proportion  of  truth  in  the  hypothesis  with  every  new 
instance" (CP 6.473). Quantitative induction is more useful for 
the  final  testing of  hypotheses  as  it  operates  through 
measurements,  statistics,  or  counting  and  its  conclusion  are, 
therefore, capable of generating probable truths. 
The view of abductive discovery as inference is enabled 
through  Peirce's  conception  of  logic  as  a  study  of  habits  of 
inquiry  and  even  more  so  through  his  notion  of  logic  as  a 
normative science. Let us briefly elaborate on these two topics 
before  we  discuss  Peirce's  logic  of  science  any  further.  The 
connection  of  the  habits  of  inquiry  and  logic  depends  upon 
Peirce's pragmaticism9, specifically on his notion that “what we 
think is to be interpreted in terms of what we are prepared to do” 
(CP 5.35), meaning that a belief is considered a conscious habit 
of action. Along these lines, genuine doubt only arises when an 
actually functioning habit is interrupted. Such interruptions are 
9 The importance of Peirce's pragmatism to the other areas of his thought 
relevant to this paper is discussed in chapters  IV and V.
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necessary subjects of inquiry. Once one arises the aim is to arrive 
to a new belief-habit that will prove to be stable, one that would 
“lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the establishment of 
a  habit  of positive expectation that  shall  not  be disappointed” 
(CP 6.469). For Peirce, logical inquiry is exactly this activity that 
resolves  a  genuine  doubt  and  arrives  at  a  stable  belief-habit 
(Burks:1946, p. 303).
Peirce's notion of logic as a normative science is of even 
bigger importance here.  In his  view,  reasoning is  that kind of 
thinking that conforms to and operates by norms or ideals and 
logic is the science tasked with creating a theory of this thinking 
(Burks:1943, p. 190). It follows from this approach that such a 
theory must be capable of generating truly moral judgment of 
thinking,  and that  this  thinking must  necessarily be deliberate 
and self-controlled or the moral judgment would be “(no) less 
ridiculous than it would be to pronounce the growth of your hair 
to be morally good or bad" (CP 5.109). The purpose of reasoning 
is to arrive at a truth and a good reasoning is therefore that which 
succeeds in resolving a doubt and results in genuine knowledge 
(Burks:  1943,  p.  190). The  problem  here  is  that  although 
reasoning aims at truth it can't be held accountable for arriving at 
it as truth and falsity lie outside of the realm of a man's control. 
What is left for logic to examine, criticize and develop are the 
methods  used  to  pursue  truth.  This  is  what  makes  logic  a 
normative science as these methods are the norms that guide our 
reasoning. This really means that they guide the way a man's 
cognition determines another cognition and for this way to be 
reasonable it  must  be an inference,  that  is  “the conscious  and 
controlled  adoption  of  a  belief  as  a  consequence  of  other 
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knowledge” (CP 2.442). Considering this theory of reasoning, it 
becomes  apparent  that  a  discovery  of  hypothesis  can  be 
considered  an  inference  as  it  can  be  seen  as  a  deliberate 
determination  of  one  cognition  (the  hypothesis)  from another 
cognition (the facts of the problem) (Burks:1946, p. 304).
We  already  noted  the  connection  of  pragmaticism and 
abductive reasoning but this relation goes much deeper as Peirce 
referred to his pragmatism as the logic of abduction. In this view, 
pragmaticism is a logical doctrine to be used in determining the 
admissibility of hypotheses (ibid, p. 307). Pragmaticism acts as a 
maxim of analysis here as it ties the admissibility of hypotheses 
to  their  practical  or  empirical  consequences  and  therefore 
"[abduction's]  conclusion  should  be  such  that  definite 
consequences can be plentifully deduced from it of a kind which 
can be checked by observation"(CP 2.786). Acting as this maxim 
is the full extent of pragmaticism in Peirce's logic (CP 5.196).
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III.III The Aim of Critical Logic
We  have  discussed  the  different  kinds  of  inferential 
reasoning that  Peirce considered instrumental  according to  his 
logic. But what is the ultimate aim of such reasoning? First thing 
to note here is that Peirce's logic is not psychological: “[l]ogic is 
not the science of how we do think; but, in such sense as it can 
be said to deal with thinking at all, it only determines how we 
ought to think; nor how we ought to think in conformity with 
usage, but how we ought to think in order to think what is true. 
That  a premiss should be pertinent  to such a conclusion,  it  is 
requisite that it  should relate,  not to how we think,  but to the 
necessary connections of different sorts of fact” (CP 2.52).  How 
the people think is not the question Peirce is asking, he rather 
seeks the conditions of a logically valid reasoning. He rejects the 
criteria of “self-evidence” and rationality as they either make the 
logical validity of a reasoning rest on an individual mind or on a 
non-testable, non-cognitive social faculty (Buchler:1939, p. 202). 
For him the validity of a reasoning rests on its correspondence 
with facts.
This  of  course  does  not  mean  that  Peirce  would 
completely ignore the psychological aspects of reasoning. On the 
contrary, he even shows that his criterion of validity is the one 
implicitly assumed when people infer. He holds that there isn't an 
instinct of rationality that would guide one's reasoning and that 
our reasoning rather relies on habits  tested by experience.  We 
form these habits through continual representation to ourselves 
of what would ensue if we make a certain supposition, that is, 
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what in fact would have to be (probably) true if certain premisses 
were  true.   Our  habits  of  reasoning  are  formed  by  our 
diagramming of facts in our imagination. “The habits formed by 
this  continuous  representation  of  experimental  situations 
connected  in  certain  ways  are  the  factor  that  determine  the 
validity  of  all  reasoning.”  (ibid.,  p.  203).  The  habits  are 
(logically) either good or bad, and to decide that is not the matter 
of psychology but of correspondence with facts. Peirce considers 
the  habits  that  we  form  on  the  whole  good  because  we 
continually improve them10.  The habits  that enable us to draw 
correct conclusions constitute our logica utens,  the acritical and 
implicit  logic  of  a  common  man.  When  the  habits  get 
linguistically  expressed  as  rules  of  inference,  or  conscious 
leading principles, they become  logica docens, the formulated, 
scientific and critical logic (Buchler:1939, p. 204).
Peirce's  “realistic”  approach  to  judging  the  value  of 
reasoning  certainly  sheds  sufficient  light  on  how  a  probable 
inference  works.  But  there  is  a  problem  with  necessary 
inferences because they are more than just an extreme kind of 
probable ones and to say so clearly misses an important part of 
their constitution. Different classes of inferences are defined by 
their  respective  leading  principles.  These  principles  are 
inferential  rules  making  inferences  possible  and  they  usually 
consist  of  linguistics  formulations  of  the  habits  employed  in 
ordinary  reasoning  (CP  3.164).  Inference  can  be  considered 
necessary only if these rules themselves are logically necessary. 
In case of deduction this rule is the well-known nota notae est 
10 Note the similarity with Peirce's view of inductional inferences as 
eventually capable of reaching the truth.
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nota rei ipsus or in the modern notation: (x) (Fx  ⊃ Gx): Fa:  ⊃ 
Ga. Here we approach Peirce's notion that not every necessary 
inference  is  also  universal.  It  follows  that  there  are  two 
categories  of  deduction,  a  universal,  necessary  deduction 
(„necessary deductions) and a deduction that is necessary but not 
universal („probable deduction“). 
The  key  difference  here  is  that  necessary  deduction 
involves a universal proposition while probable one involves a 
statistical  or  particular  proposition.  In  other  words,  necessary 
deduction recognizes only the inclusion or non-inclusion of one 
class under another, whereas probable deduction takes account of 
the proportion of the class subsumed under another. This means 
that  necessary  deduction  doesn't  require  an  inquiry  into  the 
nature of cases mentioned in the premises in order to evaluate 
whether  the  quantifier  „all“  supplies  to  them,  while  such  an 
inquiry must be made in the case of probable deduction, in order 
to  see  whether  a  term „a  proportion  of“  applies  to  the  cases 
mentioned  in  the  premises.  Therefore,  necessary  deduction 
applies  to  both  discrete  and  continuous  objects  and  probable 
deduction only to  discrete  objects.  But the difference between 
these two types of inference most poignant to our topic is the one 
explained in this quote:
„A  cardinal  distinction  between  the  two  kinds  of 
inference  is,  that  in  demonstrative  reasoning  the  conclusion 
follows from the existence of the objective facts laid down in the 
premises; while in probable reasoning these facts themselves do 
not even render the conclusion probable, but account has to be 
taken of  various  subjective  circumstances,  -  of  the  manner  in 
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which  the  premises  have  been  obtained,  of  there  being  no 
countervailing  considerations,  etc.;  in  short,  good  faith  and 
honesty are essential  to good logic in probable reasoning” (W 
4:410).
„However, even if the subjective circumstances allowing 
for probability are  present,  it  is  still  the case that in probable 
deduction, the conclusion is only probable“ (W 4:411).
Peirce identifies  two kinds  of  demonstrative  reasoning, 
corollariar and theorematic. This distinction comes from Euclid 
but Peirce obviously shifted the meaning of the terms in order for 
them to fit into his semiotics. Corollariar deduction is such an 
argument where conclusions stem from propositions which are 
already implicitly present in premisses. Theorematical deduction 
is  the  more  demanding  type  of   argument.  It  necessitates  an 
experimental diagrammatical establishment of certain elements 
not present among the original premisses in order to successfully 
conclude.
To sum up, Peirce considers reasoning valid if it follows a 
proven habit of inquiry and in doing so infers from a fact or a set 
of facts onto a certain corresponding belief; such a belief may 
likely hold true either necessarily or just statistically but as long 
as it was reached in such a way that it connects the arrangement 
of facts in the phaneron to their arrangement in our imagination 
it can on the whole be considered good, albeit always a subject to 
further inquiry. Let us now discuss Peirce's evaluation of some of 
these habits.
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III.IV On the Fixation of Belief
To  understand  Peirce's  evaluation  of  different  belief-
habits we must firstly briefly return to the discussion of different 
methods  of  fixation  of  belief.  As  we noted  previously,  Peirce 
engaged himself in the natural sciences for a major part of his 
life.  Therefore,  it  is  hardly  surprising,  that  he  considers  the 
scientific  method  to  be  the  best  for  fixation  of  a  reasonable 
belief. But he identifies three other modes of fixation as well. 
These modes or methods are very common in everyday thought 
but can rather simply lead to a false belief. According to Peirce, 
the most common method amongst humans is based on authority. 
That means that a certain belief is adopted from a certain trusted 
source. The aspect of trust is of utmost importance here, as there 
is  no  other  reason  to  accept  such  belief  besides  experience 
acquired   about  the  source  either  directly  or  indirectly.  The 
human susceptibility to and preference for this form of fixation is 
likely hardwired in our brains as it is an important aspect of our 
ability to create and maintain self-organizing and self-regulating 
societies.  Unfortunately,  the  human  history  offers  much  too 
plentiful  examples of  beliefs based on authority,  which led to 
some of the greatest tragedies ever suffered.
An another rather common method of fixation of belief is 
the  method  of  tenacity.  Here  a  belief  is  fixated  through 
elimination  of  or  disregard  for  the  facts  that  could  possibly 
destabilize  it.  This  is  supposed  to  be  happening  on  both  the 
individual and the collective level and it is probably important to 
point out that it never failed so often for us both as individuals 
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and as a society as it does in this day and age. The “information 
age”  we  live  in  now  makes  it  especially  difficult  to  protect 
beliefs against doubt. Peirce considers this a good thing but it is 
an unfortunate fact seen many times in our history that when our 
beliefs are shattered and we are overcome with doubt it is rather 
the  voice  of  authority  that  calms  us  down  than  the  voice  of 
reason and science.
The third method is called the “a priori method”, the idea 
here being that a human mind has a direct access to a body of 
knowledge prior to experience. This naturally causes a couple of 
problematic  points  to  arise.  Firstly,  there  are  only very few a 
priori  truths  that  philosophers  would  be  able  to  agree  about. 
Secondly, the contents of our consciousness are an inseparable 
interconnection of culturally-based truths that are often based on 
authority.  Even  though  these  points  definitely  somewhat 
eliminate the a priori method as a proper means to reach a true 
belief Peirce gave it some merit in the sense that humans have a 
rather  strange ability to  “guess” answers  in  face  of  extremely 
complicated issues and that the hypotheses they formulate often 
originate as mere feelings - but only the scientific method can 
tell whether these hypotheses lead to true beliefs.
So the scientific method is, according to Peirce, the by far 
best  one to  use  to  fixate  our  beliefs  in  such a  way that  they 
approximate  truth.  The  method  of  inquiry  embodied  by  the 
scientific method is naturally temporal and subject to permanent 
improvement and thus doesn't aim to pretend to arrive at some 
absolute, perfect truth. Instead, the truth it reaches can always be 
found wrong in the light of new facts that undermine it.
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IV Peirce on the Classification of Sciences
IV.I Introduction
We  surveyd Peirce's  view of  the  human desire  to truly 
understand the world from the most fundamental aspects of it 
reaching our consciousness to the most profound methods of the 
fixation of beliefs we hold about it. The real beauty of this view 
is  that  it  encompasses  all  aspects  of  how  a  consciousness11 
apprehends  the  world  being  presented  to  it  without  creating 
unnatural and needless thresholds or divisions. Let us now take 
advantage  of  this  great  feature  of  Peirce's  theory  and  try  to 
explore the different ways  a mind can process the world around 
it with the intent to reach truth as they are classified by Peirce 
and see how they interconnect and differ.
11 Not necessarily a human or even a self-aware consciousness.
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IV.II The Scientific Discourse
Let  us  start  with  the  field  of  inquiry  that's  effectively 
trying to embody the proper method of the fixation of belief. We 
talk  about  the  scientific  discourse  here  in  the  sense  that  we 
discuss  the  way  of  thinking  and  expressing  the  thoughts 
considered proper to the different fields by C.S. Peirce.
Science is in the lives of men who work together with a 
certain  degree  of  cooperation  and communication.  These  men 
form the smallest group among the three distinct, discrete ones 
Peirce identifies in the paper we just cited. He suggests that the 
by far largest group are people who devote themselves to seeking 
enjoyment, both for themselves and for the other. He considers 
this group necessary. The other group sees as the aim of life to 
accomplish results: „[t]hey build up great concerns, they goy into 
politics,  not  as  the  heeler12 does,  for  a  living,  but  in  order  to 
wield  the  forces  of  state,  they  undertake  reforms  of  one  and 
another kind.“ (ibid.). This is the group that makes civilization. 
Finally,  the  third  group  seeks  to  truly  understand  the  physio-
psychical universe13. These are the men of science. It is worth 
noting here that  the incremental  triadic conception once again 
resonates in this classification, as enjoyment stems from a certain 
quality,  results  require  action  and understanding is  impossible 
without representation.
The  men  seeking  understanding  further  segregate 
12 A „hack politician“.
13 Peirce operates with a conception of God in this paper. Refer to section 5 
for a detailed discussion of this topic.
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themselves  in  another  three  groups,  according  to  their 
conceptions of the purpose of science. The men in the first group 
(„prattospudists“)  consider  themselves  tutors  and  superiors  to 
those  who  aim  to  accomplish  results.  Science  is  there  to 
determine the world's work and they therefore cultivate applied 
sciences.  The  development  of  applied  sciences  would  be 
impossible without a sort of a digest of science, a systematized 
account for all  human knowledge. The second group concerns 
itself  precisely  with  producing  such  digests.  These  men 
(taxospudists)  regard  science  as  being,  organized  knowledge 
(ibid.) and they practice the sciences of review. The third group 
consists  of  men  engaged  in  the  endeavour  to  discover 
(„heurospudists“).  It  is  true  that  all  men  of  science  aim  to 
discover. The prattospudists endeavor to discover for the ultimate 
purpose  of  doing  and  the  taxospudists  for  the  purpose  of 
applying knowledge in any way, be it in action or in cognition 
(ibid.).  But  the  heurospudists  look  at  discovery  as  the  very 
purpose  of  why the  human race  exists.  Advancing the  minds' 
understanding  of  the  original  psycho-physical  universe  to  its 
farthest possible point is to them the ultimate, self-contained goal 
of the heurospude. It is a purpose so significant that even the 
existence of the human race pales in importance compared to it: 
“Remember that the human race is but an ephemeral thing. In a 
little while it will be altogether done with and cast aside. Even 
now  it  is  merely  dominant  on  one  small  planet  of  one 
insignificant star, while all that our sight embraces on a starry 
night is to the universe far less than a single cell of brains is to 
the whole man” (ibid.).
These observations lead to a classification of science that 
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we  stick  to  in  our  explanation  of  Peirce's  views.  The  first 
division he bases his classification on is into branches,  that is 
according to the fundamental purpose of the given sciences. This 
constitutes two branches: theoretical, whose purpose is to reach 
the truth about the universe, and practical, for the uses of life. 
Theoretical sciences split into two subbranches. We focus first on 
the science of  discovery and discuss  the science of  review in 
chapter IV.VII. The second division is based on the way certain 
sciences make their observations. This constitutes the classes of 
mathematics,  coenoscopy  and  idioscopy  (the  latter  2  terms 
originate in the work of Jeremy Bentham and designate a science 
concerned with the phenomena known to all mankind and with 
discovery of new phenomena, respectively).
Peirce  is  also  especially  adamant  in  highlighting  the 
social and the temporal aspect of science: „But what I mean by a 
"science",  both  for  the  purpose  of  this  classification  and  in 
general, is the life devoted to the pursuit of truth according to the 
best  known  methods  on  the  part  of  a  group  of  men  who 
understand one another's ideas and works as no outsider can. It is 
not what they have already found out which makes their business 
a science; it is that they are pursuing a branch of truth according, 
I will not say, to the best methods that are known at the time. I do 
not call the solitary studies of a single man a science. It is only 
when a group of men, more or less in intercommunication, are 
aiding and stimulating one another by their understanding of a 
particular group of studies as outsiders cannot understand them. 
that I call their life a science. It is not necessary that they should 
all be at work upon the same problem, or that all should be fully 
acquainted with all that it is needful for another of them to know; 
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but their studies must be so closely allied that any one of them 
could take up the problem of any other after  some months of 
special  preparation  and  that  each  should  understand  pretty 
minutely what it is that each one's of the others work consists in; 
so that any two of them meeting together shall  be thoroughly 
conversant with each other's ideas and the language he talks and 
should feel  each other  to  be  brethren. In particular,  one thing 
which  unites  them  is  their  common  skill,  not  possessed  by 
outsiders, in the use of certain instruments, and their common 
skill in performing certain kinds of work. The men of that group 
have dealings with the men of another group whose studies are 
more abstract, to whom they go for information about principles 
that the men of the second group understand better, but which the 
men of the first group need to apply. At the same time the men of 
this first group will probably have far more skill in their special 
applications  of these principles  than have the members of the 
second group who understand better the principles themselves. 
Thus  the  astronomer  resorts  to  the  student  of  optics,  who 
understands the principles of optics better that he does. But he 
understands the applications of those principles to astronomical 
instruments  and  to  work  with  them  far  better  than  the  pure 
optical student does“ (MS 1334). 
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IV.III Mathematics and the Formal Sciences
Among the  formal  sciences  belong  such  disciplines  as 
mathematics, logic and statistics. These disciplines are concerned 
with the study of formal systems and as such are characterized 
by a high degree of formality and internal consistency. They are 
very important and interesting from the Peircean point of view as 
the  systems they study are  completely enclosed  sign  systems. 
This means that any doubt that is to destabilize the understanding 
of these systems must arise from within themselves rather than 
from some new external fact entering them. In other words, there 
is  no  boundary  between  the  system  being  examined  and  the 
system operating the examination. Axioms specify the basic rules 
of operation of certain objects (such as sets, elements, or values) 
and lead to some definitions for those objects. Some basic facts 
about the objects  in question can be proven and these proofs, 
called  propositions,  lead  to  more  complex  proofs,  called 
theorems.  Axioms,  definitions,  propositions  and  theorems 
constitute a formal theory. 
Speaking specifically of mathematics,  we shall  make a 
detour  here  and  come  back  to  Peirce’s  division  of  sciences 
already  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter.  Peirce  divides 
mathematics into three orders (CP 1.283). In today’s terms, these 
could  be  roughly  correspondent  to  discreet  mathematics, 
mathematics of the infinite and mathematical or formal logic. He 
regards mathematics as the provider of basic guidelines for other 
sciences,  particularly  for  philosophy.  Given  our  previous 
explanations,  it  should  be  fairly  clear  why.  There  are  no 
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existential  concerns  about  the  beliefs  mathematics  arrives  at 
because  mathematics  creates  imaginary  objects  according  to 
abstract  rules  –  there  is  no  reason  for  a  new  surprising 
destabilizing fact to arise in a closed system like that; therefore, 
there is no reason not to trust in the beliefs properly drawn on its 
basis.  “As  for  what  the  truth  of  existence  may  be  the 
mathematician does not (qua mathematician) care a straw” (CP 
1:53). These  beliefs,  in  the  form  of  “necessary  conclusions” 
about  mathematical  constructs,  provide  general  laws  or 
principles for acquiring other true beliefs, imaginary or actual. 
The  key  principles  through  which  mathematics  arrives  at  its 
conclusions are abstraction and generalization, which are a in an 
important sense a certain form of peculiar observation. They are 
also necessary for what Peirce considers the scientific method 
proper (Burks:1978).
Peirce,  whose  father  and  brother  were  both  university 
math teachers, advanced mathematics and mathematical logic in 
various ways and identified its importance for a proper scientific 
interpretation of the world. The ideas of  Firstness,  Secondness 
and Thirdness, for example, are best thought of as mathematical 
possibilities  –  it  is  the  possibility  of  certain  objects,  of  their 
interactions  and  of  the  laws  that  govern  them.  „Mathematics 
studies  what  is  and  what  is  not  logically  possible,  without 
making itself responsible for its actual existence“ (CP 2.184).
The  attributes of  formal  sciences  we  identified  above 
apply to the more specialized of them as well. For example, the 
operations research, a field of study developed in the beginning 
of the World War II, deals with problems such as task scheduling 
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and bin packing. Task scheduling looks for the optimal way to 
sequence a number of factory tasks, which are subject to certain 
conditions and requirements. Bin packing deals with how to fit a 
heap of articles of given sizes into a number of bins of given 
capacities. (The Formal Sciences...:1994, p. 19). Although these 
are both apparently practical problems, the search for solution is 
imaginary  and  abstract.  The  tasks  or  items  and  the  machines 
running them or bins meant to contain them are defined in the 
beginning of the search and there is no way for new ones to enter 
the system, otherwise it  would be an entirely new problem to 
solve.  The  methods  used  to  find  the  optimal  solution  apply 
mathematical procedures to rule out the ineffective ones.
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IV.IV Philosophy
Philosophy is the class of sciences that deals with positive 
truth yet contents itself with  observations such as come within 
the range of every man's normal experience,  and for the most 
part in every waking hour of his life (CP 1:241). This is entirely 
true  for  the  first  subclass  of  coenoscopy,  which  Peirce  calls 
necessary  philosophy  (or  epistemy,  as  this  subclass  alone 
represents  the  Platonic,  and generally  Hellenic,  conception  of 
epistémé).  The  other  subclass,  called  theorics,  is  based  on 
universal  observations  but  might  make  use  of  some  special 
observations  as  well.  This  subclass  contains  families  of 
chronotheory  and  topotheory,  which  are  concerned  with  the 
general  questions  about  the  nature  of  time  and  space, 
respectively.
Epistemy divides in three orders. The first order is called 
phenomenology, or the doctrine of categories, and its task is to 
make  the  ultimate  analysis  of  all  experience,  to  “unravel  the 
tangled skein [of] all that in any sense appears and wind it into 
distinct  forms”  (CP  1:280).  Peirce  considers  this  the  most 
difficult order of coenoscopy to practice and notes that even a 
mere appreciation of advances already made in it is beyond reach 
of many who even wrote books about it. We have tried to show 
the basics of Peirce phenomenological research in the chapter 1.
The second order of epistemy consists of the so called 
normative sciences.  “A normative science is one which studies 
what ought to  be” (CP 1:281).  Not ought  to  be in a practical 
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sense,  although  it  is  clear  that  they  are  connected  with  the 
practical sciences, but ought to be in a purely theoretical sense. 
This  means  that  the  normative  sciences  are  in  fact  the  most 
theoretical order of coenoscopy. The normative sciences form a 
department  of  coenoscopy  that  consists  of  three  intertwined 
subbranches. Logic is the theory of deliberate thinking, practics 
is concerned with the theory of the conformity of action to an 
ideal and  esthetics is the theory of deliberate formation of habits 
of  feeling.  Note  that  ethics  doesn't  appear  here  because  it 
involves the theory of the ideal itself and, in so far as it studies 
conformity of conduct to an ideal,  it  is limited to a particular 
ideal, which is in fact nothing more than “a sort of composite 
photograph of the conscience of the members of the community” 
(CP 1:573). Also note that, for Peirce, esthetics is not limited to 
“taste” but relates to all the feelings, even the deepest and earnest 
ones: “the theory is the same, whether it be a question of forming 
a taste in bonnets or of a preference between electrocution and 
decapitation, or between supporting one's family by agriculture 
or by highway robbery” (CP 1:574). While demarcation of lines 
discretely  separating  the  three  subbranches  is  certainly 
unnecessary to carry out, it seems apparent that esthetics relates 
to feelings, practics to action and logic to thought, once again 
alluding to the basic phenomenological categories of Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness, respectively.
Metaphysics, the third order of epistemy, is the science of 
reality (EP 2:459). It seeks to explain the origin and constitution 
of the physio-psychical universe (MS 1339:12  ) and as such in 
places connects with idioscopy. It is distinguished from it mainly 
by its containing itself to such parts of physics and of psychics 
55
that  can  be  established without  special  means  of  observation. 
These parts  have some very peculiar properties as opposed to 
those studied by idioscopic sciences. Peirce also set forth further 
division of metaphysics into three families in his 1903 lecture at 
the Lowell Institute. While at odds with some of the divisions 
presented  above  and  only  marginal  in  the  whole  of  Peirce's 
system, we shall mention this division as it concerns topics we 
discuss  later  in  this  paper.  These  are general  metaphysics  (or 
ontology); psychical (or religious) metaphysics, concerned with 
the  questions  of  god,  freedom  and  immortality;  and  physical 
metaphysics, which discusses the nature of time, space, laws of 
nature, matter etc.
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IV.V The Natural Sciences
According  to  the  aforementioned classification  of 
sciences,  the  natural  (or,  in  Peirce’s  terms,  physical)  sciences 
together with the psychical (or human) sciences form the class 
called  idioscopy.  This  class  is  occupied  with  accumulation  of 
new facts and depends upon special observations carried out by 
individuals  or  groups  with  access  to  a  special  training  or 
specialized tools. The physical sciences further divide into three 
orders.  „Nomological  physics  discovers  the  ubiquitous 
phenomena of the physical universe, formulates their laws, and 
measures their constants. It draws upon metaphysics and upon 
mathematics for principles. Classificatory physics describes and 
classifies physical forms and seeks to explain them by the laws 
discovered  by  nomological  physics  with  which  it  ultimately 
tends to coalesce. Classificatory physic splits into two suborders. 
The first one consists of studies of kinds of matter, the second of 
the kinds of forms the matter may take. (CP 1:262). Descriptive 
physics describes individual objects — the earth and the heavens 
— endeavors  to  explain their  phenomena by the principles  of 
nomological  and  classificatory  physics,  and  tends  ultimately 
itself to become classificatory“ (CP 2.188). The subclass of the 
physical  sciences  aim  to  set  forth  the  working  of  efficient 
causation,  that  is  the  active  relations  of  parts  in  the  physical 
world and their origin.
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IV.VI The Human Sciences
The  psychical  sciences  (or  psychognosy,  Peirce's 
tendency to vary his terminology in different papers and lectures 
assure that his commentators are never in the lack of synonyms) 
aim to set forth the workings of final causation, that is the active 
relations of the world and the mind and inside the mind as well. 
Similarly to the physical sciences, psychognosy further divides 
into  three  orders,  the  nomological,  the  classificatory  and  the 
descriptive.  The  nomological  psychognosy  (or  psychonomy) 
aims “to formulate with exactitude the laws governing the final 
causation and show how its workings are to be traced out” (CP 
1:269). Peirce also identifies a second suborder of psychonomy, 
which  concerns  itself  with  other  laws  subordinate  to  the 
universal law of final causation. The classificatory psychognosy 
(psychotaxy) studies the kinds of mental manifestation. Its first 
suborder embraces studies of mental performances and products 
(e.g. linguistics, ethnology), the second one of incarnations, or 
ensoulments of mind (e.g. sexology, developmental psychology) 
(CP  1:270).  Descriptive  psychognosy  likewise  splits  in  two 
suborders. The first one constitutes of descriptions of man-made 
systems or examinations of individual productions of man, while 
the other of narrations of events and their succesion (CP 1:271).
Just like the observations of mathematics and philosophy 
qualitatively differ from each other and from the observations of 
idioscopy,  those  of  psychognosy  differs  from  those  of 
physiognosy (the physical sciences), although to a lesser degree. 
Physiognosy  observes  physical  facts,  while  psychognosy 
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observes virtual conventions – even though these can be often 
represented in physical form. An example of this is a philologist 
studying certain regional variants of pronunciation – the various 
cases  of  variance  do  not  constitute  a  specific  language 
phenomenon,  the social, psychical conventions underlying them 
do that (CP 1:250).
Physiognosy  depends  in  some  of  its  endeavors  on 
mathematics  and  philosophy,  especially  metaphysics. 
Psychognosy depends on these superordinate classes too but in 
this case it is logic that is the most important because the final 
causation is logical causation. An example of this would be “the 
intimate bearings logic has on grammatical syntax” (ibid.). More 
importantly,  everything  in  psychognosy  is  inferential.  An 
emotion is recognized as a particular one only inferentially. Any 
object is referred to the mind only inferentially. These properties 
of the psychical mean that  even though it is not what these aim 
to study, they must base their inquiries on the physical, on the 
facts (CP 1:154). This is not to say that psychognosy depends on 
physiognosy,  although  there  are  some  cases   such  as  the 
assistance linguistics gets from acoustics  and from the human 
biology. Physiognosy assists psychognosy more so than the other 
way around but its influence is still miniscule compared to the 
one of mathematics on philosophy or of both on idioscopy.
The social  aspects of science identified in the previous 
chapter apply to psychognosy just  as much as to physiognosy 
and the inner division set forth by Peirce is very much parallel 
for both the classes.
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IV.VII The Sciences of Review and the Practical  
Sciences
The sciences of review, also called the systematic, tactic 
or   tagmatic  sciences,  or  the  taxospude,  form  the  second 
subbranch of the theoretical sciences. It is the activity and the 
results of that activity of the taxospudists. This activity aims not 
to add to the human knowledge but  to render what has already 
been  discovered  comprehensible,  that  is,  “to  put  it  into  such 
shape that the mind can grasp and handle it with facility“ (MS 
601:26 ). This requires sorting out the results of the heurospude, 
subjecting them to comprehensive criticism and deducing their 
best  conclusions.  These  conclusions  are  are  to  be  digested  in 
handbooks  and  the  classification  of  the  sciences  and  the 
characterization  of  their  different  classes  is  to  be  made.  This 
allows  for  the  creation  of  broad  surveys  such  as  Comte's 
“Philosophie  Positive”  or  Spencer's  “Synthetic  Philosophy” 
(ibid.).
The practical sciences, or theory of arts, or prattospude, is 
the  branch of  science  which  is  selected,  arranged  and further 
investigated in details as a guide to the practice of an art (NEM 
4:191). It consists of “building up edifices of knowledge  as is 
motivated  by  a  desire  of  ministering  to  a  human  want“  and 
makes  for  by  far  the  greater  part  of  all  scientific  labor  (MS 
601:27 ). We will discuss Peirce's view of the arts in chapter V.
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IV.VIII Conclusion
Such is  Peirce's  view and classification  of science.  Let  us 
reiterate the most important aspects. Firstly, science is not just some 
body of knowledge. It is a mode of life characterized by a certain 
purpose  and  by  certain  requirements  necessary  for  a  successful 
fulfillment of that purpose. This is true for mathematical logic and 
stylistics alike. Secondly, there are various characteristics that can be 
used to identify various classes of science. The ones chosen by Peirce 
show  the  interconnectedness  and  the  gradual  emergence  of  the 
sciences  but  also  their  fundamental  differences,  which  make  the 
classification into a hierarchy. This hierarchy is not based on certain 
classes  being  deemed  inherently  better,  after  all,  the  question  of 
(logical) goodness and badness is central to all the sciences. Instead, 
it  stems  from  identifying  in  certain  classes  a  need  for  methods 
developed in the classes being “above” them. Thirdly, accumulation 
and  interpretation  of  new  facts,  while  absolutely  crucial  for  the 
scientific method, is not really what constitutes science.
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V Peirce on God, Arts and the Ordinary Life
V.I Introduction
We  have  surveyed  Peirce's  view  and  classification  of 
science in order to ascertain what he considers important about it 
and how exactly he delimits it. This section discusses what lies, 
so to speak, above and below the realm of science.
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V.II Peirce on God
As noted in  the chapter IV.V, Peirce quite  often works 
with the conception of God in his later writings and lectures. He 
even  wrote  two  papers  concerning  specifically  this  topic: 
“Answers to Questions Concerning My Belief in God” from the 
year 1903 (CP 6.494-521) and “The Neglected Argument for the 
Reality of God” from the year 1908 (CP 6.452-91). We believe 
Peirce's view of God, as presented in these papers and elsewhere, 
is a wonderful illustration of the scope, influence and validity of 
his semiotics, regarding everything from the conception of the 
categories of experience to the classification of science and  to 
pragmaticism. It is also a prime example of Peirce as a poet14.
Firstly, it must be stated that Peirce's belief in God is not 
that  of  the  Christians  -  or  of  any organized  religion,  for  that 
matter. Instead, God is the immanent, universal thought which 
constitutes  the  order  of  the  universe.  It  is  a  construction  of 
something  which  science  aims  to  discern  but  which  is 
unattainable and therefore must only act as an object of adoration 
for the scientists. This of course doesn't mean that Peirce's God is 
not real. Reality of God is in Peirce's antinominalistic view of the 
same kind as that of the law of gravity or of the feeling of pain. It 
is the reality of a sign which creates other signs by virtue of its 
interpretants. This process is not dependent on the human mind 
and thought, it pertains to the whole universe.
God cannot be found using the scientific method as all 
14 More on that in chapter V.II.
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kinds of inferences are insufficient for this task. For induction to 
work, God would either have to be expressible as a probability 
ratio,  as an affair  of frequency or  his  parts  would have to  be 
evaluated.  Both  options  are  equally  absurd.  An  explanatory 
hypothesis would only work if God was a contingent being, only 
so  necessary  as  the  facts  to  be  explained.  Deduction  would 
require God to be purely formal in nature (Hartshorne:1941, p. 
517). The idea of God then must have another origin - which is 
in musement15: “No, as to God, open your eyes – and your heart, 
which is also a perceptive organ – and you see Him” (CP 6.493, 
497).
Peirce  doesn't  deny  that  the  notion  of  God  is 
anthropomorphic  on  the  basis  of  his  criticism of  the  idea  of 
things-in-themselves, which, being completely different from our 
nature  and  experiece,  are  consequentially  unknowable  and 
strictly  unthinkable.  Anthropomorphism  as  a  doctrine  of 
analogical  relations  between  ourselves  and  other  is  a  more 
reasonable alternative (Hartshorne:1941, p. 518). The analogy of 
God, which is by definition of a uniquely remote kind from us, 
15 “There is a certain agreeable occupation of mind which, from its having no 
distinctive name, I infer is not as commonly practiced as it deserves to be; for 
indulged in moderately – say through some five to six per cent of one’s 
waking time, perhaps during a stroll – it is refreshing enough more than to 
repay the expenditure. Because it involves no purpose save that of casting 
aside all serious purpose, I have sometimes been half-inclined to call it reverie 
with some qualification; but for a frame of mind so antipodal to vacancy and 
dreaminess such a designation would be too excruciating a misfit. In fact, it is 
Pure Play. Now, Play, we all know, is a lively exercise of one’s powers. Pure 
Play has no rules, except this very law of liberty. It bloweth where it listeth. It 
has no purpose, unless recreation. The particular occupation I mean – a petite  
bouchée with the Universes – may take either the form of aesthetic 
contemplation, or that of distant castle-building (whether in Spain or within 
one’s own moral training), or that of considering some wonder in one of the 
Universes, or some connection between two of the three, with speculation 
concerning its cause. It is this last kind – I will call it “Musement” on the 
whole – that I particularly recommend, because it will in time flower into the 
Neglected Argument” (CP 6.458).
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naturally leads to a rather vague idea of Him.
Peirce's conception of God and his scarce discussions of 
the  theological  problems  connected  to  it  are  not  without 
inconsistencies and logical stumbles (ibid., pp. 520-523) but this 
is of little consequence to us. What matters is that we can see the 
supreme conception in Peirce's depiction of the universe and the 
role  it  plays  in  the  layout  of  the  universe  and for  the  minds 
occupied with studying how the universe operates.
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V.II Peirce on Art
We already noted  some of  Peirce's  views of  art  in  the 
previous chapters. Art is among the products of the largest group 
of people, those who seek enjoyment in their lifes. It is also an 
area  of  applied  science  where  the  prattospudists  so  inclined 
process the knowledge of idioscopic sciences in order to facilite 
creation of such products. Furthermore, art is one of the subjects 
of esthetics, even though it surely isn't the only one. Finally, art 
is similar to phenomenology in its mode of observation, although 
it obviously isn't science precisely for the reason that its purpose 
is to embody certain qualities of feeling.  An artists employs a 
peculiar mode of observation in his search for these qualities and 
this  mode is  very similar in  nature to  the one employed by a 
phenomenologist  in  his  endeavor  to  discern  the  most  basic 
elements  of  phaneron.  The difference is  that  the  training of  a 
phenomenologist  has  him  never  satisfy  himself  with 
identification of a particular quality of a percept until he finds 
them all while, according to Peirce, it is in the nature of an artist 
to focus on reproducing the qualities he identified (CP 5.112). 
One can easily imagine a classification of art based on this idea 
that would kind of stand between imagology and thematology 
but, unfortunately, that has little to do with the topic of this paper 
so we shall just leave it here as an idea and move on.
There is a famous formulation in Peirce's explanation of 
the nature of perceptual judgments which bridges the topics of 
this  chapter  and the  previous  one:  “Therefore,  if  you  ask  me 
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what part Qualities can play in the economy of the universe, I 
shall  reply  that  the  universe  is  a  vast  representamen,  a  great 
symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living 
realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to 
it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such 
part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument 
that, they of course, play in the universe — that Universe being 
precisely  an  argument.  (…).  The  Universe  as  an  argument  is 
necessarily a great work of art, a great poem — for every fine 
argument is a poem and a symphony — just as every true poem 
is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a painting 
— with an impressionist seashore piece — then every Quality in 
a  Premiss  is  one  of  the  elementary  colored  particles  of  the 
Painting;  they  are  all  meant  to  go  together  to  make  up  the 
intended Quality that belongs to the whole as whole. That total 
effect is beyond our ken; but we can appreciate in some measure 
the resultant Quality of parts of the whole — which Qualities 
result from the combinations of elementary Qualities that belong 
to the premisses” (CP 1.119).
There is a bunch of statements in this excerpt relevant to 
our topic:
• The universe is a symbol of God's purpose.
• The universe is an argument.
• Every true poem is a sound argument.
• Every fine argument is a poem and a symphony.
• The universe as an argument is necessarily a great work 
of art, a great poem.
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Going back to the previous expositions, the meaning of 
these  statements  seems  pretty  clear.  The  first  one  basically 
summarized the points we made in the previous chapter – the 
universe can be understood as a symbol based on the interpretant 
of  God  Himself.  A symbol  produces  energetic  interpretants  – 
God is a real entity behind the actions and manifestations of the 
universe. The universe is an argument in the sense shown in both 
chapter II and III. On the one hand, it is of the class of signs 
which produce logical effects,  that  is  habits  and laws. On the 
other hand, it most certainly is a process of thought reasonably 
tending to produce a definite belief (CP 6.456).
Now, what is the relation of an argument to a work of 
art16? If it  is the aim of art to reproduce how certain percepts 
connect  to  certain  qualities17,  then  this  is  perfectly  clear. 
Consider the painting from the excerpt above. An impressionist 
painter aims to replicate how certain alternations of appearance 
of a familiar object connect to emergence of certain qualities of 
feelings because the peculiar nature of this emergence, which he 
noticed through his artistic observation of the phaneron, brings 
him to a state of doubt. He is making a good, valid argument that 
certain premisses (various compositional and thematic aspects of 
the paintings) lead to a certain conclusion (qualities of feeling) 
which satisfy his doubt. We can even return to the discussion of 
the three types of argument from chapter IV here and show that 
all of them are in play in this case in the same way the scientific 
method employs them. First, such an artist makes the hypothesis 
16 Considering Peirce mentions literary, visual and auditory arts, it seems safe 
to assume the differences among various art forms are inconsequential 
regarding this topic.
17 E.g.: “Poetry is one sort of generalization of sentiment, and in so far is the 
regenerative metamorphosis of sentiment” (CP 5.676). 
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that these particular percepts lead to the observed conclusion. He 
then deduces their nature and interaction and uses the tools of his 
art  to  replicate  the  objects  of  those  percepts.  Finally,  he 
inductively tests  his  hypothesis  by observing the  effect  of  his 
painting on others as well as himself. 
Notice  that  what  distinguishes  an  impressionist  painter 
from an experimental  psychologist  specializing  in  visuality  is 
really  nothing  internal  to  the  argument/painting  itself.  A 
psychologist  might  design  an  experiment  where  he  would  be 
interested in the qualities of feeling instigated by certain visual 
impulses and would let people watch a painting in order to see 
the  reactions.  What  guarantees  that  his  endeavor  is  indeed 
scientific  are  the  numerous  external  aspects  mentioned  in  the 
previous chapters, such as use of specialized tools and language, 
preference  for  quantitative  induction,  repeatability  of 
experiments, peer reviewing, etc.
A true work of art is an argument. A fine argument is a 
work  of  art  because,  again,  it  truly  allows  to  replicate  how 
certain percepts connect to certain qualities. Take the classical 
argument for Socrates' mortality. It is a work of art because it 
shows something generally applicable to how a (human) mind 
experiences  the  universe.  This  interpretation  makes  the  last 
statement on our list obvious.
69
V.III Peirce on Practice
The description we give in chapters II, III and IV already 
picture  Peirce's  view  on  the  relation  between  science  and 
practice.  We  show  how  a  force  being  exerted  onto  a  mind 
represents to that mind some generality or law via its being as a 
sign.  This  universe  of  signs  acts  on  the  basis  of  habits.  A 
deliberate habit of a mind is a belief. An emergence of a state of 
doubt concerning a certain belief necessitates an inference from 
another  belief(s)  to  (a)  new  belief(s).  Practice  aims  to  to 
eliminate doubt and to satisfy need. Reasoning is an inference 
which regards the new found belief(s)  as  a  result  of previous 
belief(s).  There  are  certain  kinds  of  reasoning  and  a  certain 
method of combining them which best allow to discern truth. No 
truth is infallible besides the truth of the universe itself – God. To 
understand Him is the aim of science.
There are some interesting notes on this topic from Peirce 
himself which we shall discuss here. We can find the following 
example in  a  lecture  regarding his  criticism of  the nominalist 
denial of the reality of Thirdness: “Speaking strictly, belief is out 
of place in pure theoretical science, which has nothing nearer to 
it than the establishment of doctrines, and only the provisional 
establishment of them, at that. Compared with living belief it is 
nothing but a ghost. If the captain of a vessel on a lee shore in a 
terrific storm finds himself in a critical position in which he must 
instantly either put his wheel to port acting on one hypothesis, or 
put his wheel to starboard acting on the contrary hypothesis, and 
his vessel will  infallibly be dashed to pieces if he decides the 
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question wrongly, Ockham's razor is not worth the stout belief of 
any common  seaman. For stout belief may happen to save the 
ship,  while  Entia  non  sunt  multiplicanda  praeter  necessitatem 
would be only a stupid  way of spelling Shipwreck” (CP 5.60). 
This example illustrates Peirce's assertion that scientific belief is 
of a weaker kind than belief which is necessitated by situations 
where  one  lacks  the  opportunities  to  apply  various  logical 
approaches and examine the results.  These “living beliefs” are 
based on instinct and devoid of theoretical considerations, they 
are “stout” because they are unhindered, while the beliefs of an 
advanced  science  are  frail  and  bleak  amidst  the  various 
inferences  and  experiments,  they  are  “but  a  ghost  of  beliefs” 
(ibid.).
Peirce makes a similar point in his discussion of “vitally 
important  topics”  (CP 5.623-629).  He  argues  that  we  should 
distinguish everyday affairs  from great  crises in our  lives and 
that, besides theories, reason is only sufficient to deal with the 
less important problems. We believe in a proposition if we are 
willing to act on it. Full belief is willingness to act on it in vital 
crises and willingness to act upon it  in relatively insignificant 
cases is opinion. There is nothing vital in science except for the 
logic's highest impulse to never stop generalizing - and even this 
single  point  is  insufficient,  for  such  generalizations  “should 
come about, not merely in man's cognitions, which are but the 
superficial  film  of  his  being,  but  objectively  in  the  deepest 
emotional springs of his life” (CP 1.673).
It seems to us that the similarities between science and 
practice are just as important as the differences. These are both 
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certain  ways  a  mind  interacts  with  the  universe.  The  major 
differences  lie  in  the  purpose  of  this  interaction  and  in  the 
specific  circumstances which surround it.  These circumstances 
include a group of agents acting together in an organized effort, 
using specialized tools  and given ample time.  The purpose of 
science, as  seen in chapter IV, is to lead to an understanding of 
the universe for the sake of this understanding itself. The purpose 
of  practice  is  to  either  feel  or  act.  But  it  is  clear  from  our 
discussions  that  there is  no understanding without  quality and 
action, no action without quality, and quality by itself is but a 
potential. Therefore, there shall be plenty of practice in science 
and plenty of science in practice. A proper Peircean analysis of 
instances of one with regard to the other adds to the discussion of 
art  genres,  fields  of  activity  and  scientific  disciplines  on  the 
theoretical  level  and to  the  tools  of  criticism on the  practical 





Let us assume we have a chocolate bar consisting of a 
number of squares arranged in a rectangular pattern. The task is 
to  split  the bar  into small  squares  (always  breaking along the 
lines between the squares) with a minimum number of breaks. 
How many will it take?
This sort of inquiry radically differs from all the others in 
that  its  subject  is  clearly defined and imaginary and therefore 
free from any potential changes while also being accessible to a 
certain kind of “observation”. To solve a formal problem is to set 
it up as an argument and the beauty of this argument is that it is 
forever valid. Somebody or something might one day set up a 
more beautiful, cleaner argument but the conclusion to which it 
leads  will  inevitably  be  the  same.  The  solution  to  the  given 
problem requires diagramming of facts. Specifically,  we might 
consider a bar consisting of a single square. Obviously, we only 
need 0 breaks then to solve the task. In modern notation P(1)=0, 
where  P is  the  number  of  breaks  needed  and  the  number  in 
bracers is the total number of squares in a bar. Using induction 
we can assume that P(k) holds true for 2≤ k≤ n, where n is the 
number of squares in a bar, therefore P(n+1)=n. To prove this 
assumption, we need to again diagram the facts. This time we 
imagine  breaking  the  bar  into  two  section  n₁ and  n ,  where₂  
n +₁ n =n+1. Using our assumption, we note that P( n )= n -1 and P(₂ ₁ ₁  
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n )=  ₂ n -1. The total number of breaks is then 1+(n -1)+(₂ ₁ n -1)=n.  ₂ It 
follows that P(n+1)=n which proves the assumption.
The  reasoning  of  formal  sciences  leads  to  conclusions 
that  are unreasonable to doubt and which apply to many other 
areas of thought. They are strictly not concerned with existence 
but  rather  with  proofs  of  theorems.  That  is  why  the  above 
example holds the same validity for the question of how many 
cuts must a lumberjack make to divide a log into certain number 
pieces or how many single-elimination matches must a certain 
number of players play in a tournament until there is a winner 
(BOGOMOLNY:2015). These  differences  have  no  bearing  on 
formal  reasoning  just  as  the  fact  that  a  chocolate  bar  will 
inevitably crumble, a lumberjack will lose his count and a bunch 
of players will drop out of the tournament to catch a bus home.
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VI.II The Universe
"A decapitated frog almost reasons. The habit that is in 
his  cerebellum serves as a major  premiss.  The excitation of a 
drop of acid is his minor premiss. And his conclusion is the act 
of wiping it away" (CP 6.286).
A frog  almost  reasons  because  reasoning  is  deliberate. 
What the frog does is infer and this is a process inherent in the 
whole physio-psychical universe. Consider we lift a stone in our 
hand and hold it some height above ground. It is the habit of any 
stone (or any object with mass) to rest without motion unless a 
force  is  exerted  upon  it.  It  is  also  its  habit  to  be  mutually 
attracted to other objects which have mass proportionally to the 
ratio of their masses.  If we let go of our grip the universe works 
out  an argument:  There is  the law of  gravity and the laws of 
motion. There is an object which has mass and is presently free 
to move. The conclusion is that the stone gets pulled by the earth 
and vica  versa  until  they stop  upon each other.  Then another 
argument  starts,  this  time  concerning  the  smallest  discernable 
parts of the objects in question.
Same holds true even for all the involuntary actions living 
creatures make. You have a ant in your room. Being a gentle soul 
you  leave  him  be.  What  can  one  ant  do?  Well  if  it  finds 
something worth taking which he cannot haul himself he will go 
back to his colony, leaving a pheromone trace behind him. This 
activates  an  inference  in  the  mind  of  many,  many  more  ant 
workers.  This  instinctual  inference  has  the  nature  of  an 
75
argument.  Their  invading  your  room and the  subsequent  long 
war is the consequence of that argument's conclusion.
You got bitten by a mosquito in your right calve. Now 
you sit  on a  sofa watching TV. Suddenly your  arm moves  to 
scratch the bite. You stop midways because you know you don't 
want to make the bite infected but, still, the argument has already 
concluded.  An unconscious  habit  was overrun by a  conscious 
belief  based  on  medicine.  Some  instinctual  habits  cannot  be 
overrun by beliefs. What if we don't let the stone just go of our 
hand and let it fall instead throw it in your face. No matter what 
you  believe,  unless  you  suffer  of  some  sort  of  congenital 
analgesia, your nerve endings will work with your brain to the 
conclusion that it  really,  really hurts.  The working out of this 
argument is a fortunate habit of mind, in no way dissimilar to 
how,  for  example,  the  earth  responds  to  the  ration  which  it 
receives from the surrounding universe.
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VI.III Coenoscopic and Idioscopic Sciences
Peirce made his vast contributions to science in the age 
when it just started the rapid acceleration that had such a huge 
impact on how we live our lives today and how the events of the 
20th century unfolded. As seen in chapter IV, the main difference 
between the idioscopic and the coenoscopic sciences lie in their 
methods  of  observation.  Consider  the  electron  microscope,  a 
device invented about a decade after Peirce's death. It has about 
5000 times  better  magnification  and  about  2000  times  higher 
resolution  compared  to  the  previous  iteration  of  the  device 
developed  for  the  same  purpose,  the  light  microscope.  The 
development  of  a  device  is  obviously  a  matter  of  practical 
science  but  the  knowledge  allowing  for  such  development  is 
based on discovery, interpretation and understanding of certain 
facts, in this case regarding properties of particles moving along 
given electrostatic or magnetostatic fields, subsumed under the 
framework of electron optics. The measurements made using the 
electron microscope again need to be interpreted and understood 
so as to allow for further theoretical progress into the nature of 
the universe. In the meantime, the practical knowledge acquired 
in the process of construction of electron microscopes comes in 
handy when the advancements of electron optics allow for the 
construction  of  particle  accelerators,  the  strongest  implements 
science has these day to  use in order to  peer  into the darkest 
depths of the micro-world theoretical physics can so far consider.
Similar  development  can  be  shown  in  the  case  of 
psychical  sciences.  Consider  the  understanding  of  the  child's 
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mind.  Developmental psychology is a relatively new discipline 
which  was  founded  in  the  beginning  of  the  20th  century. 
Previous attempts to  characterize the development of a child's 
mind were, according to Peirce's classification, either artistic18 or 
philosophical19. The first scientific advancements in this field of 
inquiry  were  made  at  the  end  of  the  19th century  under  the 
influence of the theories of Charles Darwin and Ernst Haeckel 
(Developmental  Psychology:2008).  The  facts  concerning  the 
development  of  one's  psyche  are  obviously  not  directly 
observable.  This  creates  need  for  an  indirect  method  of 
observation.  Developmental  psychology  involves  experiments 
and  long  term  close  observations  and  their  statistical 
representations in order to prove its conclusions. Advancements 
made  in  this  method  lead  to  rejection  of  older,  more  rigid 
theories whose conclusions do not correspond with the body of 
facts examined. The central  question of the role of experience 
versus  the  role  of  innate  properties  in  the  development  of  a 
child's  mind  today  seems  to  have  no  direct  answer.  Various 
experiments and observations show that both of these aspects are 
permanently  in  play.  To  push  the  understanding  even  further 
requires  either  even  more  extensive  use  of  the  methods  of 
observation already employed or an adoption of new methods 
18 All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts,
His acts being seven ages. At first the infant,
Mewling and puking in the nurse’s arms;
And then the whining schoolboy, with his satchel
And shining morning face, creeping like snail
Unwillingly to school. And then the lover,
Sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad
Made to his mistress’ eyebrow (All the world's a stage:2015).
19 Such as Locke's idea of a child's mind as “tabula rasa” or Rousseau's three 
stage development presented in his novel “Emile” (Developmental 
Psychology:2008).
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from the natural sciences - one  could for example imagine that 
one day will the biology of human brain advance far enough that 
it will be able to perfectly describe how the physical activity of 
neurons  connects  with  human  thought.  That  would  certainly 
allow for  more  precise  conclusions  about  the  development  of 
human mind.
There  is  a  lot  of  idioscopic  pseudoscience  nowadays. 
Fortunately it is fairly easy to spot if one keeps in mind what the 
scientific method entails, both generally speaking and especially 
in  Peirce's  view.  But  what  about  coenoscopic  science  and  its 
peculiar mode of observation? Can anybody be a philosopher? 
Given that the observations of philosophy are of a nature which 
makes them hard to evaluate, the criteria of a valid philosophical 
endeavor  are  the  use  of  logic  and  the  social  aspect.  Logic  is 
clearly  the  very  necessity  for  any  meaningful  philosophical 
inquiry   but  so  is  a  proper  way its  author  connects  with  the 
tradition  and  how  is  his  contribution  accepted  by  others. 
Consider Peirce himself.  There are many, many aspects of his 
thinking  about  the  universe  which  can  be  criticized,  many 
observations  which  offer  themselves  to  doubt  –  after  all,  he 
wasn't  understood  very  well  in  his  time  and  although  people 
recognized  his  genius  it  didn't  help  him  to  live  a  more 
comfortable life. The important thing is that today no one can 
doubt  Peirce's  place  in  philosophy  both  for  his  original 
contributions and for the continuity of his thought to that of his 
predecessors,  especially  the  scholastics.  A  logically  sound 
philosophy can only by judged by time.
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VI.III Art
Let us consider two areas of art production, visual and 
literary.  “The Hay Harvest”,  a painting by Pieter Bruegel,  and 
“Abstract Painting” by Ad Reinhardt will represent the visual art 
here20 and “The History of One Tough Motherfucker” by Charles 
Bukowski  and  “Sonnet  29”  by  William  Shakespeare  will 
represent  the  literary  art.  We  have  discussed  that  art  is 
characterized by its peculiar mode of observation, much in the 
same way philosophy is,  but  it  is  not  bound  by the  rules  of 
logical  inferring  and  doesn't  aim to  approach  truth  but  rather 
replicate the source of that peculiar observation in order to fulfill 
some human needs. Bruegel's painting is figurative, Reinhardt's 
is abstract. The former shows the relation of people to nature, the 
latter  shows  the  nature  of  our  understanding  of  the  visual. 
Bukowski's  poem  is  free  verse,  Shakespeare's  is  very  much 
structured.  The former shows that to endure life is a virtue by 
itself, the latter that love elevates man from the lowest depths of 
despair to the supreme heights of elation. 
Even though our examples are formally and historically 
extremely  disparate,  they  are  all  instances  of  works  of  art. 
Although it may seem distasteful to some, we argue that even 
applied arts are proper art in Peircean sense of the word. Take the 
image  of  a  woman  using  a  razor  to  shave  her  leg.  The 
impeccable  whiteness  of  the  foam contrasts  with  the  absolute 
smoothness of the patch of skin being revealed. There is a sort of 
20 These paintings are kept in the collections of the Lobkowicz Palace in 
Prague and the Guggenheim Museum in New York, respectively.
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perfection to be attained – all you need to do to experience it 
directly is to buy our new razor and foam for only $13.99. Or 
take the incredible play of the colors of the sea and the skies, 
delimited  in  the  perfect  golden  ration  by an  island consisting 
entirely of the blindingly white sands and deep green trees and 
flowers.  There  is  a  proper  harmony  of  nature,  one  you  can 
become part  of – once again, if you buy our ticket to “Island 
Paradise” for only $1499.99.
Peirce's take on art in our opinion leaves space for a sort 
of criticism. Art must have a certain vision and it must replicate 
the source of this vision in some way. That means we can focus 
our criticism on whether a work of art succeeds in, so to speak, 
letting us observe together with the author. Consider a side shot 
of a beautiful young lady lying on a table bare naked. She has 
her legs slightly bent and we see a hand pouring some sort of hot 
sauce on a leaf of lettuce she has in her lap. It should probably 
make  us  connect  the  usage  of  said  sauce  with  the  pleasure 
generally associated with this sort of image but, depending on 
our gender, it is much more likely to simply make us either angry 
or horny and thus fails as art – unless the sauce was just a pretext 
for showing how we appreciate an image of a woman body, in 
which case we doubt that the CEO of the company selling said 




Lets go back to  our example from chapter  II  here and 
discuss it again with all the knowledge presented in this paper.
Two  people  come  home  on  a  rainy  day,  soaking  wet. 
They knock off their shoes and one of them proceeds towards the 
kitchen. The other one notices this and says: „It's easy to catch a 
cold in wet clothes.” Then they both go to the dressing room to 
change.
The fact that we can read and understand this story is, as 
discussed previously, apparent evidence that Thirdness is in play 
here, just as it always is when a mind operates. The contrast of 
light wave lengths coming to our retinas from the various points 
on the paper (or screen) and the electric impulses they generate 
in our brains allow our minds to recognize certain patterns and, 
based  on  experience  with  such  patterns,  create  further 
interpretants of these patterns, in this case words. These words 
lead  to  further  interpretants  until  there  is  no  purpose  in 
continuing  the  process.  When  considering  ourselves  as  the 
readers of that text our purpose is hardly practical. In fact, we 
would  have  to  go  pretty  far  to  find  an  interpretant  with  a 
practical meaning for us – we could for example take the story as 
a  reminder  of  a  relationship  we  used  to  have  and  enjoy  the 
bittersweet memories it allows us to recall. But this is a scientific 
paper,  albeit  in  the  field  of  science  of  review,  and as  such is 
concerned  with  truth.  We want  to  see  what  is  the  relation  of 
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thought  and  action  in  that  story  and  to  do  that  we  have  to 
consider it as an argument. Our hypotheses are that proceeding 
towards the kitchen is interpreted as communicating the intent to 
go  wash  oneself  first  before  taking  any other  action  and  the 
sentence „it's easy to catch a cold in wet clothes” in fact means 
“when  one's  in  wet  clothes  its  best  to  change  as  soon  as 
possible”. Now if this was a real situation we were inquiring into 
and not  just  an  example  we would  be  able  to  deduce  further 
conclusions from said hypotheses and then inductively test them. 
Since  it  isn't  we  have  no  way  to  experimentally  test  it  and 
because the conclusion of the story conforms to the conclusion 
of our abduction we just have to be satisfied with that and call it 
a good day until some other scientist comes to let it rain on our 
parade.
The situation is different from the viewpoint of the actors 
in  the  story  themselves.  They  are  firmly  in  the  realm of  the 
practical  but  they need to  infer  nevertheless  because  they are 
both at a certain point of the story cast into the state of doubt. 
The person uttering the sentence is the first one in doubt. His 
belief that it is best to get out of wet clothes as soon as possible 
is disrupted by his inference that the other person plans to do 
something else based on his present actions, namely to go wash 
himself. He chooses to restate his position on the matter in other 
to reconcile his belief with the belief of the other person and in 
doing  so  to  prove  its  worth  above  the  already  scientifically 
proven. This illustrates an important point about human social 
conduct,  which  is  that  the scientific  proof  of  validity is  often 
considered  insufficient  compared  to  the  authority  of  others 
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around us. Whether a certain belief  is objectively true matters 
nowhere as much as whether other people act upon it.
The person speaking chooses to formulate his sentence in 
a particular way because of the existing social conventions on 
the communication of ideas. If the person instead said “I firmly 
believe that it  is best to change out of wet clothes as soon as 
possible”, it would be easier for the other person to understand 
the locus of the statement.  But it  could also lead to the other 
person thinking that the first one sort of has a stick up his or her 
rear. So the sentence is instead the way it is which leaves the 
other person in doubt about its intended meaning. Based on the 
experience  with  the  English  language  the  receiving  person 
understands that the sentence is declarative. Yet the situation in 
which it is uttered suggests that it might be of imperative nature. 
So the receiving person makes a hypothesis that the sentence in 
fact  means  “we  should  both  first  go  change  before  we  do 
anything else”. From that he deduces that he should go change. 
The fact that the other person doesn't say anything else and goes 
to change with him proves that the argument is valid.
One thing to note is that if one of the people were a dog 
very little would change in a certain respect. Consider a person 
coming home with his dog. They are both soaking wet. Just as it 
is  important  to  change  oneself  out  of  wet  clothes  as  soon as 
possible, it is also important to dry the dog's fur before he soils 
the whole flat. But the dog has a habit of running right to the 
kitchen to  have  a  drink  when he  arrives  home.  So no matter 
whether he's wet or not as soon as the person opens the door to 
84
the flat the dog runs to the kitchen. But the person says “come” 
with a strong voice and goes to  the bathroom. The dog turns 
around and follows him to get dried. The dog obviously doesn't 
have the ability to understand precisely what his master means 
by the word “come” but  his  experience taught  him that  if  he 
recognizes  this  specific  sound  pattern  coming  from  certain 
people he is supposed to follow them. The dog infers, although it 
doesn't reason.
Our final point regarding this example concerns Peirce's 
belief that the scientific reasoning has no place in the matters of 
vital importance. Imagine the two people come home, open the 
door and the flat is very hot and filled with smoke. It is safe to 
assume they would not think about the nature of the elements, 
the best way to communicate the fact that their flat is on fire or 
even about the reason why the fire started. They would rather act 
on instinct, yell “Fire!”, call the firemen and try to combat the 
fire themselves or evacuate the building. Scientific reasoning has 
its  place  in  many affairs  of  the  human life.  Just  not  in  those 
closest to our heart. Consider some great love in your life and try 
to construct a scientific argument that could make you abandon 
it. We believe such a task is  impossible to accomplish and that it 
is incredibly stupid to strive for it – because we shouldn't doubt 
in science what we do not doubt in our hearts (Peirce:1868). And 
all the search for truth cannot ever disprove that the heart is more 
than the head, that it is our highest concern (MS 435).
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VII Conclusion
We discussed Peirce's thinking on the basic nature of the 
universe in its being as a sign, on the various kinds of inferences 
a mind makes from this sign, and on the differences  between the 
discernible areas of thought, action and quality that sustain and 
constitute such universe. Although science is not and should not 
be  the  ultimate  guide  for  conduct,  understanding  Peirce's 
categories, classes and types allows to nuance what exactly is the 
nature of a certain inquiry or sign with respect to its purpose, its 
method of observation and its argumentation.
Let us now sum up our findings - for clarity and to the benefit of 
any potential  lazy reader.  There are three categories always in 
play when a mind interacts with the universe. These categories 
are Firstness, or quality, Secondness, or relation, and Thirdness, 
or representation. The universe gives itself to a mind as a sign. 
Every  sign  has  an  object  and  an  interpretant  and  the 
particularities of their nature constitute the classes of signs.
Arguments  form a  class  of  signs  which  distinctly  show what 
interpretant  they  are  intended  to  determine  (MS  491:9). 
Argumentation  is  the  expression  of  reasoning  (EP  2.11-12). 
Reasoning  is  conscious  inferring.  Inference  is  the  process  of 
setting up a new belief in the face of a doubt.
There are various forms of argumentation and various  methods 
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of fixation  of  belief.  The scientific  method employs  a  certain 
sequence of argumentation and observation which validates its 
results. This validation is always only temporary and unfit  for 
issues of vital importance. The fields of scientific study differ in 
their purpose and in their method of observation. The methods 
and  findings  of  the  more  abstract  disciplines  serve  an 
instrumental role in the development of the less abstract ones – 
the findings and methods of mathematical logic are instrumental 
to the idioscopic sciences, and those of the idioscopic sciences to 
the  coenoscopic  sciences.  Furthermore,  the  findings  of  the 
sciences of discovery need to be organized by the sciences of 
review before they can be practically applied.
Practice, in fact, underlies and enables the scientific reasoning. 
On the one hand, the most basic inferences used in mathematics 
rely on imaginary diagramming of abstract facts in accordance 
with how they are actually. In other words, the most fundamental 
inferences  of  mathematics  formally  follow  the  practical 
inferences, which are either involuntarily learned or instinctual. 
On the other hand, the ultimate aim of science is to understand 
practice – of God Himself, that is to understand the universe as 
an argument.
Allow us to conclude with an image. Practice is a vast landscape 
with  wild  forests,  rugged  mountains,  rushing  rivers  and  deep 
lakes under an ever-changing, furious skies. Science is an ivory 
tower which protrudes  from the middle of this  land,  perfectly 
chiseled and impeccably organized, floor after floor filled with 
knowledge  of  increasingly  abstract  nature.  The  tower  differs 
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from  its  surroundings  in  form  and  intention,  but  not 
fundamentally. It is still of the land, but it wants to survey the 
land and understand it and at the same time to understand itself. 
However, no matter how tall it gets the land around is always too 
extensive to be seen in its entirety. Perhaps, when the height of 
the tower matches the height of the pillar on which God resides, 
it will finally be able to see all the land. That might never happen 
– but it is a worthy goal to aim for.
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